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THE WORLD IN OUR COURTSt 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: 
CoMMENTARY AND MATERIALS. By Gary B. Born with David Wes­
tin. Deventer/Boston: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers. 1 989. 
Pp. XXV, 736. $75. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International civil litigation shares with complex litigation, of 
which it is often a part, 1 increasing practical importance and substan­
tial theoretical interest. In their recently published and extremely val­
uable book on international civil litigation, Gary Born and David 
Westin posit that U.S. courts have "begun to develop a distinct, cohe­
sive body of law" (p. 1 )  and that there is an "emerging field of interna­
tional civil litigation" (p. 3). Although the authors have organized the 
book so as to treat nine topics in a way that "track[ s] the course of 
lawsuits involving foreign parties in U.S. courts,"2 they also identify 
and trace the influence of five "common" or "basic themes that fre­
quently recur in international civil litigation" (p. 3). These common 
themes, in their minds, make international civil litigation a field rather 
than a collection of topics. 
This scheme of organization is felicitous, offering both detailed 
treatment of the most important practical problems in international 
civil litigation and recurrent opportunities to think about unifying 
themes. The book is as much a treatise as it is a collection of materials 
for course study, reflecting not only an extraordinary bibliographic 
t Copyright 1991 by Stephen B. Burbank. 
• Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, Harvard University. 
- Ed. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Gary Born, Frank Goodman, Leo 
Levin, Harold Maier, Jerome Marcus, Gerald Neuman, Linda Silberman, Stephen Subrin, and 
my colleagues in the University of Pennsylvania Ad Hoc Seminar. All errors are theirs. 
Just prior to publication of this review, the Supreme Court acted on the proposed amend­
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 and 26 that are criticized infra text accompanying 
notes 16 1 -200 and 228-40, declining to transmit them "at the present time pending further con­
sideration by the Court." Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Vice President Dan 
Quayle (Apr. 30, 1 99 1 )  (copy on file with author). 
I. See Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 ( 1 987). 
International civil litigation tends to be complex not so much because of party structure, but 
because of the substantive or procedural issues involved. See infra text accompanying notes 14-
55 (legislative jurisdiction), 102-200 (service of process abroad), 201-40 (taking evidence abroad). 
2. P. 2. The nine topics, treated in successive chapters, are Judicial Jurisdiction, Service of 
Process Abroad, Forum Selection, Taking Evidence Abroad, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Sub­
ject Matter and Legislative Jurisdiction, The Act of State Doctrine, Recognition and Enforce­
ment of Foreign Judgments, and International Arbitration. 
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achievement3 but also the ambition of the authors, practitioner/schol­
ars who, in the best tradition of international lawyers, have made nu­
merous contributions to knowledge.4 As a result, International Civil 
Litigation should quickly both stimulate and become the standard text 
for courses in law schools, and it is an essential volume for the libraries 
of firms involved in international practice. It is also a good place for 
scholars interested in expanding their horizons, whether from a base in 
domestic or in international law, to begin to think about problems at 
the "crossroads." 5  
As one such scholar, whose base lies in the domestic law of proce­
dure (including conflicts and evidence), I have found it fruitful, if not 
necessary, to approach International Civil Litigation by considering 
the roles of domestic analogies. Certainly, as the authors contem­
plated, this has proved a useful pedagogical strategy. Most students 
come to the study of international litigation after learning the rules 
governing domestic litigation. Even if only as a concession to the 
shortness of life, initiates look for the familiar as a means to grasp the 
unfamiliar, and domestic analogies can effectively stress continuities 
and highlight discontinuities. In this case "students" includes many, 
perhaps most, teachers and practitioners of international civil litiga­
tion, for whom the approach should also prove congenial. Finally, it is 
a useful perspective from which to judge the authors' claim that there 
is, or is about to be, a field here in the sense of a discretely identifiable 
"law of international civil litigation" (p. 3), as well as to address the 
implicit normative questions: should there be such a field and, if so, 
what should it contain? 
In pursuing these inquiries, I do not mean to question the utility of 
the course of study offered in International Civil Litigation. On the 
contrary, as I have already suggested, the authors' materials, including 
their penetrating questions and textual analyses, make a compelling 
case for the systematic study of the problems presented in litigation 
that involves foreign parties. I am persuaded, in other words, that 
international civil litigation is an area or field of law of what Michael 
3. Particularly because many teachers, students, and practitioners using International Civil 
Litigation for the first time may be unfamiliar with much of the vast literature cited by the 
authors, a bibliography, organized by topic, would be useful. I would also recommend that the 
next edition include a table of cases. 
4. See, e.g., Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 1 7  GA. J. INTL 
& COMP. L. 1 ( 1987); Westin & Born, Applying the Aerospatiale Decision in State Court Proceed­
ings, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 297 (1988); Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judg­
ments and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and England, 19  LAW & POLY. 
INTL. Bus. 325 ( 1987). Mr. Born also edits a newsletter for his firm, Wilmer, Cutler & Picker­
ing. According to the first issue, it "will be distributed quarterly, free of charge, to lawyers and 
others interested in U.S. litigation involving foreign parties or transactions." Editor 's Introduc­
tion, Inti. Litig. Newsletter, Feb. 1990, at 1. I have found the newsletter, "[t]he organizational 
and analytical approach of (which] is modelled on" International Civil Litigation, very valuable. 
5. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public 
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INTL. L. 280 ( 1982). 
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Moore calls a "nominal kind,"6 one that "can . . be justified by the 
heuristic needs of the legal profession."7 I am interested in the ques­
tion whether it is, as the authors seem to claim, more than that, and in 
particular whether it is a field or area of "a functional kind. "8 Does 
that which the authors call international civil litigation seek, in 
Moore's words, "to realize some underlying kind of justice,"9 and if 
not, should it do so? Ultimately, my hope is to shed light on that 
which is, and that which could be, of special interest from the perspec­
tive of legal development, including both the applicable legal rules and 
the appropriate sources of the rules, whatever their content. 
II. Is THERE A FIELD IN THIS CLASS?10 
The themes that the authors identify as recurring in international 
civil litigation (pp. 3- 1 8) are an amalgam of norms (public interna­
tional law, international comity), structural concerns (international re­
lations, federalism), and methodology (interest-balancing). Viewing 
international relations as a subset of separation of powers, neither the 
structural concerns nor the methodology is unique to international 
cases, and the norms have domestic analogs. Indeed, our domestic 
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction (full faith and credit and 
due process) was shaped by, or at least explained in terms borrowed 
from, intemational law.11 Similarly, both the traditional choice of law 
apparatus of Joseph Beale12 and the more modem techniques of Brai­
nerd Currie13 bear evidence of international influences, in rules or ap­
proaches developed elsewhere or at home for international cases. In 
other words, viewed in historical context, domestic conflict of laws has 
6. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories, in TEL AVIV STUDIES IN LAw (D. Fried-
mann ed. 199 1 )  (forthcoming). 
7. !d. 
8. !d. 
9. !d. 
10. With apologies to Stanley Fish. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE 
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES ( 1980). 
I I .  See, e.g. , Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 1 4, 722 ( 1 878); Trangsrud, The Federal Common 
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 849, 87 1-80 ( 1989); Lilly, Jurisdiction over 
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 87, 1 24 ( 1 983). The authors note Pennoyer's 
reliance "on two related principles of public international law." P. 23. 
1 2. For Beale's debts to the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, Ulric Huber, and to the nine­
teenth-century English jurist, A.V. Dicey, as well as to Joseph Story, see Yntema, The Historic 
Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 306-08, 3 1 3 - 1 4  ( 1953).  For recent 
work on Huber, see Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction in 
19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 ( 1990). 
13. Currie conceived of choice of law as a process of statutory construction or interpretation. 
He found support, and perhaps inspiration, in the work of Lord Kames of Scotland. See B. 
CURRIE, SELECTED EsSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 379 ( 1963). Moreover, Currie's think­
ing was influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.  571  ( 1 953), 
involving the application of the Jones Act to a Danish seaman injured on board a Danish ship 
while in Havana harbor. See B. CURRIE, supra, at 364-75, 379, 434-35, 604-06, 63 1 .  
.. 
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been responsive to international as well as domestic influences and, to 
that extent at least, international litigation has not been a discrete 
field. 
Nor am I persuaded that international civil litigation is a discrete 
field today. It seems more accurate to view international civil litiga­
tion as part of a process of cross-fertilization in which ( 1 )  doctrine and 
techniques developed in the context of domestic cases are brought to 
bear on problems presented in international litigation, and (2) the in­
creasingly international dimensions of litigation in our courts prompt 
changes in doctrine and techniques, which are then applied in domes­
tic cases. 
A. Domestic to International 
As one example of a problem in international civil litigation on 
which our courts have brought to bear doctrine and techniques devel­
oped in domestic cases, 14 consider legislative, or as it is sometimes 
called, prescriptive jurisdiction (pp. 432-88). For one fresh to the 
study of international litigation from domestic law, the concept of "the 
authority of a state to make its substantive laws applicable to conduct, 
relationships or status" (p. 432) may be difficult to grasp. Our ten­
dency to frame issues of lawmaking power in terms of individual rights 
pushes into the background concerns about sovereign prerogatives 
that inform the concept of legislative jurisdiction and place it at the 
crossroads of public and private international law. 
In mining domestic analogs, vertical (federal-state) thinking con­
jures up questions about the extent of federal legislative power, poten­
tial or exercised, as against the powers of the states. Yet, meaningful 
limitations on Congress' potential legislative powers are hard to find 
today. Is Moreover, domestic questions about the extent of exercised 
federal legislative power tend to be submerged in careless talk about 
subject matter jurisdiction, in part reflecting our constitutional his­
tory, 16 that invites confusion as between legislative and judicial pow-
14. That the doctrine and techniques have been developed in domestic cases does not mean 
that they originated here, as the history recounted here demonstrates. Rather, we see a process 
in which conflicts doctrine and techniques imported from abroad and refined and applied in 
domestic cases, are then applied in international cases, with additional domestic refinements sim­
ilarly extending their influence. 
1 5 .  See, e.g .. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.  528 ( 1 985) (upholding 
the application of federal overtime and minimum wage requirements to state employees); Ely, 
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 700-06 ( 1974). 
1 6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 401 comment c ( 1987); Lowenfeld, A ntitrust, Interest A nalysis, and the New Conflict of 
Laws (Book Review), 95 HARV. L. REv. 1976, 1979 (1 982) ("the idea of 'subject matter jurisdic­
tion' is a misplaced relic from the constitutional battles of the 1920's and 1930's"); Comment, 
Sherman Act "Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 2 1  ( 1983). 
To their credit, the authors are alert to such confusion. See p. 404 . 
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ers. 17 Confusion on that score is also promoted by the Supreme 
Court's approach to filling federal legislative gaps with judge-made 
law.18 
Horizontal (state-state) thinking is not likely to be much more 
helpful in a search for domestic guidance on the problem of legislative 
jurisdiction in international cases, although the analogy is closer. 
Conflicts students know that state legislatures rarely address questions 
of power by providing choice of law rules or otherwise indicating the 
intended reach of the norms they establish.19 They also know or 
should know that, when framed in terms of legislative intent, interest 
analysis is usually an exercise in fiction.20 The result has been that the 
closest thing to legislative jurisdiction upon which such students can 
fasten are domestic constitutional limitations on the application of 
state law. Here too, the search for meaningful limitations is largely an 
exercise in history. 21 
Still, approaching the problem of legislative jurisdiction in interna­
tional cases from a domestic perspective has some value. Once atten­
tion is focused on the appropriate analogs, it becomes clear that the 
uniform tendency of our domestic law has been toward the loosening 
of mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power, federal 
and (inter-) state, with the result that meaningful limitations at both 
levels are the result of self-restraint. In that process, courts have 
played a prominent role, if only by default. 
The same has been true, I believe, in international cases in our 
courts when the question has been whether there is legislative jurisdic-
17 .  Professor Brilmayer observes "that [because of the 'public law taboo') in those cases 
where the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (but not the Restatement of Conflicts) applies, 
lack of legislative jurisdiction entails lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Brilmayer, The Extra­
territorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (No. 3), 1 1 , 1 3  ( 1987) (footnote omitted). She adds: "In a case brought in 
federal court, adjudicative jurisdiction will typically depend upon whether there is a federal ques­
tion, which in tum depends on whether there is local legislative jurisdiction. If foreign law gov­
erns, the case must be dismissed." !d. This is not helpful. See, e. g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 
68 1 -82 ( 1946) ("where the complaint . . .  is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions later 
noted, must entertain the suit"). 
1 8. See Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common 
Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 755-62 ( 1986). As pointed out there, the 
Court too often has "leap[ed) from a conclusion of federal power to one of judicial power," id. at 
758 (footnote omitted), and, although in recent years it has been more reluctant to apply uniform 
federal rules in preference to state law adopted as federal law, the Court has treated the matter as 
one of "judicial grace or borrowing," id. at 762, when in fact the process is governed by the Rules 
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 ( 1988). See infra note 1 26. 
19. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 13, at 8 1 -82. 
20. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 
( 1980). 
21 .  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 ( 198 1). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 8 1 4-23 ( 1 985) (application of Kansas laws to every claim in nationwide 
class action unconstitutional). 
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tion. Perhaps a reason is that domestic experience and influences have 
long shaped, and continue to shape, our responses to such questions. 
Professor Lowenfeld22 has noted the reference to conflict of laws in 
Judge Hand's opinion in the Alcoa case,23 which ushered in the con­
cept of "effects" jurisdiction in international antitrust cases (pp. 437-
38, 442-43). He also pointed out that in the 1909 American Banana 
decision,24 Justice Holmes made reference to a domestic conflicts clas­
sic.2 5 If domestic conflicts thinking "changed a good deal [between] 
the Alcoa case"26 and the time Professor Lowenfeld was writing, even 
greater changes had occurred since 1909. The one constant has been 
resort to domestic law for rules and techniques that may also serve in 
international cases. 
Professor Lowenfeld is a champion of cross-fertilization, and the 
assimilative views he expressed in his 1979 Hague Lectures27 proved 
highly influential in the formulation of the Restatement  (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 28 The Restatement's pro­
visions on prescriptive jurisdiction, in particular section 403,29 bring to 
22. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, 
and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311, 380-8 1 (1979). 
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 48 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1 945). 
24. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 2 1 3  U.S. 347 ( 1 909). 
25. In a reference usually omitted in editions of the American Banana case for antitrust or 
international law purposes, Justice Holmes continues "This principle was carried to an ex­
treme in Milliken v. Pratt, 1 25 Mass. 374 (1 878)." In that case, as all students of American 
conflict of laws cases will remember, a Massachusetts lady was deprived of the defense of a 
Massachusetts rule prohibiting married women from guaranteeing their husbands' debts, on 
the ground that her guarantee had been mailed from Massachusetts to Maine and had only 
there become effective upon receipt by the lender and execution of the contract that gave rise 
to the debt. 
Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 435 n . 1 19; see American Banana, 2 13 U.S. at 356. The Court also 
referred to A.V. Dicey's treatise on conflicts. A.V. DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1908); 
see 2 1 3  U.S. at 356. International Civil Litigation discusses American Banana at pp. 435-36. 
26. Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 38 1 .  
27. Lowenfeld, supra note 22. 
28. See id. at 364; see also Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A Reply 
to A.V. Lowe, 75 AM. J. lNTL. L. 629, 637-38 ( 198 1 ). Professor Lowenfeld was an Associate 
Reporter for this effort. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES v ( 1 987). 
29. § 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
( 1 )  Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not 
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections 
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined 
by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which 
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory; 
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the reg­
ulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or 
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regu­
lating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to 
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
1462 Michigan Law R eview [VoL 89:1456 
bear on the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction the full panoply of 
techniques, from the consideration of contacts30 to the evaluation of 
interests, 31 that have been used to dissolve and resolve domestic choice 
of law problems.32 Not surprisingly, those provisions have been the 
object of many of the same criticisms with which modem choice of 
law approaches are taxed, including unmanageability and unpredict­
ability, lack of institutional capacity and expertise, and parochial 
bias. 33 
Just as domestic rules of constitutional law today provide few 
checks on federal legislative power vis-a-vis the states or on state legis­
lative power vis-a-vis other states, 34 so do rules of international law 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system; 
(f ) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international 
system; 
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and 
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a 
person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an 
obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in 
light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that 
state's interest is clearly greater. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 
( 1987). Section 402 provides: 
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to 
( 1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; 
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; 
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within 
its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its 
territory; and 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against 
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests. 
!d. at § 402. Both sections are discussed at pp. 459-65. 
For illustration of the principles set forth in §§ 402-03 in specific substantive contexts, see 
§§ 41 1-13 (tax); § 414 (foreign subsidiaries); § 415 (antitrust); and § 416 (securities regulation). 
See also § 441 (foreign government compulsion); § 442 (transnational discovery). 
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 403(2)(a), (b). 
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 403(2)(c), (e), (g). 
32. See Maier, supra note 5, at 286-87. Section 403(2) can be seen as a means to discover 
false conflicts, with § 403(3) providing the method for resolving true conflicts. See Meessen, 
Conflicts of Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (No.3), 47, 
68-69 (1987). For the domestic analogs, see, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 1 3, at 1 77-87. 
33. Pp. 461-65. For a sampling of domestic critiques of interest analysis to the same effect, 
see R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 230-34 (4th ed. 1 987). For work 
that ties the critiques together, see Brilmayer, supra note 17. 
34. The extent to which the Constitution protects foreigners in our courts is a subject that 
may warrant additional attention from the authors in the next edition. They note that the Court 
has "assumed that the due process clause [is) fully applicable to the assertion of [personal] juris­
diction over foreigners . . . .  " P. 67. But constitutional limitations may be relevant to other 
topics treated in International Civil Litigation, including legislative jurisdiction. See Brilmayer, 
l l 
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only weakly constrain extraterritorial assertions of legislative jurisdic­
tion. Indeed, Congress can constitutionally disregard rules of interna­
tional law in passing legislation for application to conduct or 
transactions with contacts outside of the United States (p. 443), and 
there is no international tribunal empowered to check its excesses. 3 5  
As a result, the problems of authority in the domestic and interna­
tional contexts are alike primarily because, and to the extent that, 
Congress fails to specify the territorial reach of federal legislation. 
For a time, traditional territorial conflicts rules and twin presump­
tions against extraterritorial application and interpretations that 
would violate international law (p. 434)- American Banana may re­
flect all three3 6- operated to put the brakes on extraterritorial appli­
cations of U.S. law. But, as we have seen, domestic conflicts thinking 
changed, and the presumption against extraterritorial application may 
be hard to justify in connection with statutes explicitly directed to 
"foreign commerce."37 Today such a presumption is difficult to justify 
at all,38 which may be one reason why so much effort has been devoted 
to invigorating its twin presumption. The focus of the effort has been 
to establish that the jurisdictional "rule of reason" of section 403 (pp. 
459-65) is a rule of customary international law. 
When, as is usually the case, Congress has failed to specify whether 
or to what extent a statute applies to conduct or transactions having 
extraterritorial links, it falls to the courts to "interpret" the statute. 
Left to their own devices, U.S. courts predictably, but not invariably 
(pp. 462-63), choose an interpretation of the statute that advances its 
policies over one that frustrates those policies or subordinates them to 
the policies of another country. The devices that lead to such behavior 
are not confined to knee-jerk parochialism. Brainerd Currie's interest 
analysis proceeded on the premise that courts in a democratic society 
supra note 17, at 24-35; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM . L. REV. 1587, 1 592, 1598-99 
( 1 978). But see Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor 
Brilmayer's Appraisal, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39, 4 1  (domestic experience 
with constitutional control of state court jurisdiction and state choice of law do not inspire confi­
dence about "the Court's ability to fashion principles that would resolve problems created by the 
overlap of domestic and foreign legislation . . . .  ") . 
35 .  See Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evi­
dence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 733, 744-45 
(1983). 
36. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 2 1 3  U.S. 347, 355-56 ( 1 909). Interna­
tional Civil Litigation quotes from this portion of the opinion at p. 436. 
37. See Wood, International Jurisdiction in National Legal Systems: The Case of Antitrust, 
10  Nw. J. INTL L. & Bus. 56, 58 ,  72 ( 1989). 
38. See Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598 (1990). But see Wood, supra note 37, at 72 (advocat­
ing presumption against extraterritorial effect). The Supreme Court has recently declined an 
opportunity to break down distinctions, decried by Professor Turley, between the extraterritorial 
reach of market and nonmarket legislation. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Il l S. Ct. 1 227 
(1991) (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act not applicable to U.S. citizen employed abroad by U.S. 
employer). 
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should not balance the interests of two or more sovereign states, 39 and, 
in response to his critics, the most that Currie would allow was "room 
for restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what state pol­
icy is and where state interests lie."40 Those who reject Currie's pro­
posed solution to true conflicts (the law of an interested forum applies) 
are necessarily engaging, through a variety of techniques,41 in what 
might be called interstate comity. 
Some courts and commentators see in section 403 nothing more 
than international comity (p. 46 1 ), what Professor Lowenfeld has 
called "unilateral interest analysis, although tempered by statesman­
ship."42 It was Lowenfeld's hope that the section would state a rule of 
international law.43 If it did,44 the presumption against interpreting a 
statute so as to bring it in conflict with international law would pro­
vide U.S. courts with a principled basis45 upon which to refuse to ap­
ply domestic legislation that did not specify its reach to conduct or 
transactions the regulation of which would serve the statute's policies. 
My conditional specifies a "principled basis" rather than a "principled 
method." Because status as customary international law requires 
"consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obliga­
tion" (p. 13), variations in practices regarding the exercise of judicial 
discretion can defeat claims to such status,46  one of many reasons why 
39. See B. CURRIE, supra note 13, at 182. 
40. !d. at 186; see also id. at 604. 
4 1 .  See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 33, at 24 1 -46. 
42. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, at 1984. 
43. See id. at 1 980-84; Lowenfeld, supra note 28, at 638; see also Maier, supra note 5, at 281-
85  (distinguishing two meanings of comity). 
44. Section 403 had a stormy history in the deliberative processes of the American Law 
Institute. See Kessedjian, Le Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Un 
Nouveau Traite de Droit International?, J.  DU DROIT INTL. ,  Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 56-58; Maier, The 
A uthoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 M ICH . J. INTL. L. 
450, 465-68 ( 1 989). The "principle of reasonableness" in the exercise of legislative jurisdiction is 
said to be "a rule of international law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 comment a ( 1987). No such statement is made in connec­
tion with § 403(3), involving conflicting exercises of jurisdiction, the result of disagreement on 
the point among members of the Institute. See Kessedjian, supra, at 62 n. 104; Maier, supra, at 
468. 
45. This is a rule of legislative construction whose purpose is to ensure that courts do not 
accidentally, by exercising the judicial power, put the United States in violation of its inter­
national obligations when that result was not intended by the political branches. Under this 
rule of construction, however, the court's search of international authorities is carried out to 
serve the domestic constitutional principle of separation of powers, not to give effect to 
substantive international community policy for its own sake. 
Maier, supra note 44, at 454-55 n.12; see id. at 466. 
46. See Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of National 
Laws, 10 YALE J. INTL. L. 185, 208 ( 1 984); cf Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia 
Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (criticiz­
ing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 
because "a court's job is to reach j udgments on the basis of rules of law rather than to use a 
different recipe for each meal. "). 
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commentators deny it to section 403's provisions.47 
The aspirations and claims of the authors of the Restatement 
notwithstanding, the problem of legislative jurisdiction in interna­
tional cases is, like its analogs in domestic law, chiefly one of self­
restraint. 48 Whatever the force of political theory in favor of forum 
law in interstate cases, 49 we should take very seriously concerns about 
refusals to apply U.S. law (the policies of which would be served by its 
application) when they implicate this nation's interests in foreign pol­
icy or foreign trade.50 Those who advocate a dichotomy between sub­
ject matter jurisdiction (what Congress intended) and prescriptive 
jurisdiction (what international law permits) broaden the scope of a 
domestic error.51 "Subject matter jurisdiction" is not the question, 52 
and the question of legislative jurisdiction is always one of statutory 
construction or, depending on where one draws the line between inter­
pretation and supplementation, of federal common law. 53 In ap­
proaching that task, courts should be alert not only to the limited role 
of customary international law, but also to limitations on their role 
and competence and to the very real risk that "[j]udicial application of 
a restraint doctrine could . . . undercut attempts by the Executive to 
negotiate compromises over jurisdictional conflicts .. . .  "54 In many 
cases, the real problems are not those of legislative jurisdiction; they 
47. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 46; Meessen, supra note 32, at 59; Trimble, A Revisionist 
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665, 704 -05 ( 1986); Comment, Anti­
trust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce: Suggestions for Procedural Reform, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 
1003 , 103 1 (1987) . For similar views on the Restatement's provisions regarding antitrust and 
securities transactions, see Meessen, supra note 32, at 54. 
48. Cf Oxman, supra note 35, at 747-48  (principles of self-restraint flowing from "absence of 
outside judicial control" and inability of courts to perform "negotiating and political functions"). 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 39-4(). The influence that legislative jurisdiction cases 
with international elements had on Brainerd Currie's thinking about domestic choice of law, see 
supra note 13, may in fact have made him more sensitive to such matters. 
50. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 73 1 F.2d 909, 948-5 1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (reprinted at pp. 463-64). 
5 1. But see Turley, supra note 38, at 635-36 (making such a dichotomy). 
5 2. See supra text accompanying notes 1 6-17. 
53.  See Brilmayer, supra note 1 7 ,  at 35-36; Maier, supra note 44, at 464-76. 
54. Trimble, supra note 47 , at 706. Conversely, "[d]ecisions by national courts that purport 
to recognize foreign governmental interests while in fact adopting a parochial analysis do a 
greater disservice to the international system than would a straightforward approach that gives 
primacy to forum interests subject to international dispute resolution in the diplomatic forum at 
a later time." Maier, Interest Balancing and International Jurisdiction, 3 1  AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 
594-95 ( 1983). 
By "the limited role of customary international law," I mean primarily to refer to the scope 
of existing rules, acknowledged as such by the international community. I am also inclined, 
however, to agree with Professor Maier that customary international law is not itself an authori­
tative source of law. See Maier, supra note 44, passim; infra text accompanying notes 242-46. 
But see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES ch. 2 Introductory Note ( 1 987) ("customary international law ... is a kind of federal 
law"); Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555 ,  1566 
(1984) (customary law is "self-executing"). 
In any event, there is scope for "restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what 
1466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1456 
are problems involving disagreement on matters of substantive law 
and state policy. 5 5  
Having covered the history and current practice of legislative juris­
diction in broad scope and admirable detail, the authors of Interna­
tional Civil Litigation ask whether section "403's interest-balancing [is] 
any different from many approaches in the conflict of laws context" (p. 
462). I have suggested a negative answer to that question, one that 
ultimately turns on the role and content of international law in this 
context. That the techniques should be so similar is no surprise given 
the provenance of section 403, and both the similarities and the lineage 
are evidence against the notion that legislative jurisdiction in interna­
tional cases is part of a discrete field. At the same time, however, the 
similarities should not obscure the distinctive attributes of interna­
tional cases that may call for special deference to choices made, or that 
might be made, by the political branches. 
B. International to Domestic 
To the extent that international cases in our courts raise questions 
of procedure, it would be surprising if they were treated differently 
than domestic cases. For the tendency of the modern federal law of 
procedure, whether created in court rules or in cases, has been toward 
uniform, transsubstantive rules that apply to all cases in all federal 
courts. 56 To be sure, today the rules are often only formally uniform 
and transsubstantive, and the whole notion is, as a normative matter, 
increasingly subject to attack. 57 But the pull toward applying the 
same rule to different substantive contexts has been so strong that sub­
stantive concerns originally animating a rule are forgotten, 58 and at­
tempts to carve out an exception in a particular substantive context 
are vigorously resisted. 59 Moreover, some of the most prominent do-
state policy is and where state interests lie." B. CURRIE, supra note 1 3, at 1 86, quoted supra text 
accompanying note 40; see Maier, supra note 5, at 3 1 5. 
55. See Juenger, supra note 34, at 46; Wood, supra note 37, at 73-74. 
56. See, e.g., Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule 11, 1 37 U. PA. L. REv. 1925,  1929-41 ( 1989). 
57. See id. ; Burbank, supra note I, at 1473-75; Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The 
Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 7 1 3-19 ( 1 988); 
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Pro­
cedural Patterns, 1 37 U. PA. L. REV. 1 999, 201 8-26 ( 1989). 
58.  Thus, although the abrogation of mutuality of estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 
Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 3 1 3  ( 1971), resulted from a consideration of both 
the policies of the patent law and considerations of efficiency, 402 U.S. at 3 28-50, nonmutual 
issue preclusion quickly became the rule in federal preclusion law. The same is true of the rule in 
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 ( 1966), regarding the preclusive effect 
of administrative factfinding. 
59. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268-69 ( 1 986) (Rehnquist, J. ,  
dissenting) (imputing to the Court a special summary judgment rule in libel cases); Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 ( 1984) ("We . . .  reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns 
enter into the jurisdictional analysis"); see also infra text accompanying note 223 (presumption 
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mestic examples involve rules that are "procedural" only if that label 
is expansively applied, including constitutional rules regarding the 
limits of state court jurisdiction. 60 Those rules have also provided an 
opportunity for generalization to operate between international and 
domestic cases. But they are not the only examples of cross-fertiliza­
tion from international to domestic cases, of adjusting the rules of the 
game for a larger playing field rather than playing by different rules. 
1. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate 
The authors of International Civil Litigation treat judicial jurisdic­
tion exhaustively, perhaps too much so.61 Most undergraduate law 
students will have covered the territory thoroughly in their first year. 
For them, the important thing is to see how, if at all, the involvement 
of foreign parties changes the analysis.62 Graduate law students and 
practicing lawyers may be differently situated; however, the authors 
provide a good· deal of textual introduction, which can be supple­
mented by lecture for students and by other texts for lawyers. 
The authors' textual material, although typically helpful and thor­
ough, might be improved in two respects. First, the discussion of Rule 
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should note potential distinc­
tions between standards of amenability Gurisdiction) when service can 
be made within the state, and there may therefore be scope for a fed­
eral standard in federal question cases, and when it must be made 
outside the state under Rule 4(e).63 Second, the authors may give in­
sufficient attention to the intense debate about the respective roles of 
territoriality or federalism on the one hand, and of reasonableness on 
the other, in constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction.64 
that a subsequently enacted federal statute does not displace the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
60. See supra notes 58-59. 
61. Chapter 2, treating judicial jurisdiction, occupies I 00 pages (pp. 19-118) in a book that, 
absent appendices, etc., is 646 pages long. Apart from the considerations mentioned in the text, 
experience indicates that, for a two-hour, one-term course, that is too much. 
62. Even though most law students and litigators are likely to be familiar with Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the attention the authors devote to in rem and quasi in rem juris­
diction (pp. 90-103) is wholly appropriate because of the importance of securing property to 
satisfy a judgment. The authors were also wise in treating in some detail jurisdiction based on 
corporate affiliations or agency (pp. I 04 -17), a subject that may be neglected in domestic proce­
dure courses. Indeed, those materials provide an excellent opportunity to explore an important 
question in jurisdictional jurisprudence, to wit, the extent to which a firm should be able to 
structure its business so as to insulate itself from suit. This question is of particular importance 
in the international context, where the constellation of laws and practices that an assertion of 
jurisdiction may entail can raise the stakes dramatically. Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion in 
Frummer (reprinted at pp. 114-15) gives a sense of the risks. For a penetrating analysis of the 
problems, see Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corpo­
rations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REv. I (1986). 
63. See pp. 70-73; see also Lilly, supra note 11, at 137-38. But see id. at 138-39 (noting 
possibility of a federal amenability standard when service is made under Rule 4(d)(3)). 
64. Pp. 48-49, 54 -55. Perhaps as a result, the authors seem inappropriately agnostic on the 
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This debate has been directly fueled by Supreme Court opinions that 
sound now one theme and then the other, and it will surely continue to 
rage in the wake of the Burnham case, 6 5  upholding general jurisdiction 
based on the transitory presence of the defendant when served with 
process in the forum (pp. 35-42). It is, of course, a debate to which 
undergraduate law students at any good school will have been exposed 
in other courses. Yet, an international perspective may help to illumi­
nate it. 66 More important for present purposes, attention to the debate 
and to the cases that have fueled it calls into question the authors' 
claim that the Court's 1987 decision in the Asahi case67 represented a 
"modif[ication of] domestic due process formulations in international 
cases" (p. 56), if by that claim they mean that different "due process 
formulations" are now applied in international and domestic cases. 
The holding in Asahi, where the Court denied California's power 
to adjudicate an indemnity claim by a defendant against one of its 
component part manufacturers, will probably have limited significance 
because of its unusual facts, in particular the facts that the party in­
voking the court's jurisdiction was a Taiwanese corporation, that the 
claim involved was probably governed by foreign law, and that the 
putative party resisting jurisdiction was also a foreign corporation. 68 
But the mode of constitutional analysis used to reach that holding was 
not intended to be, and has not been, restricted to international cases. 
Beginning in 1977, when after a twenty-year hiatus the Court 
again became interested in federal constitutional control of state court 
question whether, when a national amenability standard is prescribed or authorized, reasonable­
ness plays a part in the fifth amendment analysis. See p. 77. But see Carrington, Continuing 
Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. i33, i42 (1988) ("It seems 
also likely that the fifth amendment prevents a fomm selection that is so unreasonably inconve­
nient to the defendant as to be a denial of 'fair play and substantial justice.' ") (footnote omitted). 
One should distinguish between international law and the Constitution in deciding whether it 
makes a difference where in this country an internationally foreign defendant is sued. But see 
Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 2i1 (5th Cir. 1985); p. 39. 
65. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990); see infra text accompanying 
note 106; note lOi. 
66. In addition to promoting an understanding of international influences that shaped the 
history of territoriality, see supra text accompanying note 11, such a perspective would also pro­
vide a basis for evaluating continuing reliance on transient jurisdiction in light of developments 
abroad. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 421 comment e (198i); id. at Reporters' Note 5. There is irony in the fact that a rule 
once justified in terms of principles of international law "is no longer acceptable under interna­
tional law if [presence] is the only basis for jurisdiction and the action in question is unrelated to 
the state." Id. ; see also Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International Defendants: 
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 599-
601.  
67. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v .  Superior Court o f  Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Tne case is 
excerpted and discussed at pp. 61-69. 
68. See Asah1; 480 U.S. at 114-15. For international cases sustaining the exercise of jurisdic­
tion after Asahi, see, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 9! 1 
(9th Cir. 1990); Mason v. F. LLi Luigi & Franco dal Maschio Fu G.B., 832 F.2d 3 8 3  (ith Cir. 
1987). 
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jurisdiction,69 Justice Brennan had been trying to broaden the due pro­
cess inquiry so that the attention paid to defendants did not pretermit 
consideration of the interests of plaintiffs or of the forums in which 
they sued. 70 Although the majorities in those cases paid lip service to 
the factors stressed by Brennan,7 1  in fact they decided the cases on the 
basis of an inquiry into the contacts among the defendant, the forum, 
and the litigation. 72 As a result, the Court seemed unlikely to reverse 
an exercise of jurisdiction in which minimum contacts (narrowly 
viewed) were found to exist or, conversely, to sustain an exercise of 
jurisdiction in which minimum contacts (narrowly viewed) were lack­
ing. 73 Moreover, the Court's cases provided little basis for formulat­
ing a sliding scale of minimum contacts. 74 
Against this background, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 75 gave 
Justice Brennan an opportunity to write his views into an opinion for 
the Court, if not yet into law. Although that opinion acknowledged 
that "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant 
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State,"76 it 
went on to state that "these contacts may be considered in light of 
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdic­
tion would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' "77 More­
over, the Court's opinion asserted that the same factors "sometimes 
serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser show­
ing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required."78 
Asahi made law out of Burger King 's dicta, but the law made was 
hard to discern. Given his conclusion that there were minimum con­
tacts in Asahi, Justice Brennan (joined by three others) thought that 
" [t]his is one of those rare cases in which 'minimum requirements in-
69. The hiatus was from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 ( 1 958), to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 1 86 ( 1977). 
70. See. e.g . •  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-3 13  ( 1980) 
(Brennan, J. ,  dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 1 86, 2 1 9-28 ( 1 977) (Brennan, J., concur­
ring and dissenting); Note, Burger King v. Rudzewicz: Flexibility and Predictability in In Per­
sonam Jurisdiction, 64 N.C. L.  REv. 880 ( 1986); see also infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
7 1 .  See, e.g. , World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 ( 1980); Kulka v. 
Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 ( 1978). 
72. See World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204; Rush v. 
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 ( 1980). 
73. See Lilly, supra note I I , at 107. 
74. A possible exception to this generalization is Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
770 ( 1984). There, however, the Court (per Rehnquist, J.) was responding to the analysis of the 
Court of Appeals. See 465 U.S. at 773-8 1 .  In any event, Justice Brennan capitalized on the 
Court's opinion in Keeton when it came time for him to write for the Court in Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 47 1 U.S. 462 ( 1985). See 471  U.S. at 473-77. 
75. 47 1 U.S. 462 ( 1 985) (reprinted at pp. S0-54). 
76. 47 1 U.S. at 474 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3 10, 3 1 6  
( 1945)). 
77. 47 1 U.S. at 476 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). 
78. 47 1 U.S. at 477; see supra note 74. 
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herent in the concept of "fair play and substantial justice" . . . defeat 
the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has pur­
posefully engaged in forum activities.' "79 But three members of the 
Court (including two who also joined Justice Brennan's opinion), led 
by Justice Stevens, expressed the view that "[a]n examination of mini­
mum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state 
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional."80 More­
over, that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion that commanded a ma­
jority deployed a multifactored analysis in which the place of 
minimum contacts was not at all clear.81 
The worries arising from this cacophony were, at least for me, that 
( 1 )  state (and federal) courts would discard minimum contacts analy­
sis altogether, and (2) they would regard Asahi as an invitation to as­
sert jurisdiction in the absence of minimum contacts (narrowly 
viewed). Neither development would, in my opinion, have been desir­
able. Minimum contacts is hardly a talisman, but, as developed and 
refined in recent years, the test has imparted some measure of predict­
ability to an area of law where it is very important (p. 56). Moreover, 
the requirement of minimum contacts has served as a bulwark against 
states seeking not just to adjudicate but to apply forum law.82 Hap­
pily, the lower courts have not regarded Asahi as an invitation to aban­
don minimum contacts, but they have recognized that it is authority to 
consider something more. 83 
Asahi was an international case, and its international dimensions 
79. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1 16 (Brennan, J . ,  concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78). 
80. 480 U.S. at 1 2 1 -22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
("[T]his case fits within the rule that 'minimum requirements inherent in the concept of "fair 
play and substantial justice" may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant 
has purposefully engaged in forum activities.' " (quoting Burger King, 47 1 U.S. at 477-78)). 
8 1 .  See 480 U.S. at 1 1 3- 16. The only reference to minimum contacts in Part I I . B  of Justice 
O'Connor's opinion, which was joined by all members of the Court except Justice Scalia, occurs 
in a sentence asserting that "[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the interests 
of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens 
placed on the alien defendant." 480 U.S. at 1 14. It is likely, however, that references to other 
decisions giving primacy to minimum contacts, see 480 U.S. at 1 1 2- 1 3, reflect the belief that it 
remains "the constitutional touchstone." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. See infra note 86. 
82. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 325 n.8 ( 1980). The costs of a free-form due 
process inquiry would not be confined to litigants. The Supreme Court would be called on to 
clean up the mess it had created. When it did so, I expect we would find a majority of the Court 
reasserting the primacy of minimum contacts analysis and making it clear that multifactored 
analysis is a one-way street, available to strike down an exercise of jurisdiction where the mini­
mum contacts inquiry is indeterminate but not to bless jurisdiction where minimum contacts 
(narrowly viewed) are lacking. This seems to have been Justice Stevens' position in Asahi. See 
supra note 80. If not, the Court would soon find it necessary to revisit the question of federal 
constitutional control of state choice of law. Cf Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an 
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 97-98 ( 1 978) (if forum law - then jurisdiction preference would 
require more adequate policing of choice of law). 
83. See, e.g. , cases cited infra note 87. 
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properly influenced the outcome. 84 But the case provided a vehicle for 
the reascension of a mode of constitutional analysis that had been re­
pudiated in deeds if not in words. 8 5 The "modification" it initiated is 
not one that- judging from the opinions86 - the Justices embracing 
it intended for application only in international cases, and it has not 
been so restricted in the lower courts in the years since the case was 
decided.87 
2. Arbitration 
The perceived pressures of their dockets sooner or later would 
have caused the federal courts to reexamine rules that sought to pro­
tect their jurisdiction from efforts either to avoid judicial dispute reso­
lution or to ensure that, if it was necessary, litigation proceed in a 
forum or forums agreed to in advance. In the case of agreements to 
arbitrate (pp. 605-46), Congress long ago set itself against the tradi­
tional judicial hostility. The potential of the Federal Arbitration Act88 
to override that hostility, however - particularly in state courts and 
state law cases in federal court - was not quickly realized. 89 More-
84. See supra text accompanying note 68; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 ("Considering the 
international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the 
plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . .  in this instance would be 
unreasonable and unfair."). 
The same may be true of the only two modem Supreme Court decisions that have involved 
assertions of general jurisdiction over corporations. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (reprinted and discussed at pp. 29-35); Perkins v. Benguet Canso!. 
Mining, 342 U.S. 437 ( 1 952). In neither case, however, did the Court suggest that a different 
mode of analysis applied in wholly domestic cases. 
85. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan can be seen as merely 
taking over for Justice Black, who wrote a multifactored opinion for the Court in McGee v. 
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and whose dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 256-62 (1958) (Black, J. dissenting), he joined. 
86. Note in particular the heavy reliance on Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 ( 1 985), 
a domestic case, in the two concurring opinions. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
Note also the following passage in Part II.B of Justice O'Connor's opinion (joined by all other 
Justices except Justice Scalia): 
We have previOusly explained that the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of 
jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A court must 
consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintitrs 
interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial 
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared 
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." World­
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted). 
480 U.S. at 1 1 3. 
87. See, e.g., WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1 9 89); Interfirst Bank Clifton 
v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1 988); Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 494 -95 
( l i th Cir. 1 988). 
Prior to Asahi, Professor Lilly criticized the tendency of our courts to treat international 
cases as if they were domestic for purposes of jurisdiction, but his point was that such treatment 
could lead to a "complete failure of domestic jurisdiction." Lilly, supra note I I ,  at 1 25. Asahi 
may have exacerbated that problem. See Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the 
Tubes, 23 TEXAS INTL. L.J. 55 (1988). 
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 1 4  ( 1 988). See p. 6 1 8. 
89. See Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/ 
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over, even in cases to which the Act was unquestionably applicable, 
the federal courts carved out exceptions in particular substantive 
contexts.90 
International cases furnished occasions to reconsider the excep­
tions to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,9 1 and in those 
cases the Court placed weight on "concerns of international comity, 
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and 
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for pre­
dictability in the resolution of disputes."92 The authors of Interna­
tional Civil Litigation observe: 
After Mitsubishi, the characterization of a contract as "international," 
rather than domestic, may be of importance in determining the arbi­
trability of at least some types of statutory claims, although recent 
Supreme Court decisions illustrate a readiness to enforce most arbitra­
tion agreements, even in the purely domestic context . . . . [p. 630] 
In fact, the McMahon case,93 cited by the authors, suggests that inter­
national elements no longer have much salience when the question is 
arbitration, and I wonder whether they ever really did.94 We see the 
same progression - indeed, the one influenced the other - in cases 
involving the enforceability of contractual forum selection clauses (pp. 
1 72-208), with an international case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co. , 9 5  providing a vehicle for a change in the law that has been ex­
tended to domestic cases (p. 1 77). 
International cases in our courts may present occasions for the ap­
plication of rules of law that are not pertinent in wholly domestic 
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 401 ( 1 988). For subsequent devel­
opments, federalizing the law of arbitration agreements subject to the Act, see Perry v. Thomas, 
482 U.S. 483 ( 1987); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 2 1 3  ( 1985); Southland Corp. 
v. Keating, 465 U.S. I ( 1984); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hasp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I 
( 1 983); Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 7 1  
VA. L .  REV. 1 305 ( 1985). But see Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Stan­
ford Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1 248 ( 1989) (state statutory provision permitting stay of arbitration appli­
cable pursuant to choice of law clause). 
90. See, e.g. . Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 ( 1953) (claims under Securities Act of 1 933  nonar­
bitrable); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391  F.2d 821  (2d Cir. 1 968) 
(federal antitrust claims nonarbitrable); Shell, supra note 89, at 402-04. 
9 1 .  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S .  6 1 4  ( 1 98 5) (fed­
eral antitrust claims arbitrable in international business context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
4 1 7  U.S. 506 ( 1974) (claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arbitrable in international 
business context). 
92. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629, quoted at p. 629; see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 5 1 5- 1 9. 
93 .  Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1 987) (claims under Se­
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO arbitrable in domestic business context). 
94. See 482 U.S. at 229, 232, 239-4 1 ;  Shell, supra note 89, at 409; see also Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/ American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1 9 1 7  ( 1989) (holding claims under Securi­
ties Act of 1933 arbitrable, thus overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 ( 1 953)). 
95. 407 U.S. 1 ( 1972). The Court relied on Bremen in both Scherk. 417  U.S. at 5 1 8- 1 9, and 
Mitsubishi. 473 U.S. at 629-3 1 .  For a prediction that the rule in Bremen would be extended, see 
Maier, The Three Faces a/Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6 
VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 387, 397-98 ( 1973). 
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cases. Act of state96 and foreign sovereign immunity (pp. 335-402) are 
two prominent examples. Yet, as the authors of International Civil 
Litigation recognize, even in these areas the rules have not been im­
mune to domestic infiuences.97 In any event, a few pockets of doctrine 
do not make a field of "a functional kind, "98 although their existence 
enhances the value of materials designed to serve the needs of the legal 
profession. 
III. SHOULD THERE BE A FIELD IN THIS CLASS? 
All of this begs the normative questions whether, apart from what 
the courts and the American Law Institute have done or are doing, 
international civil litigation should be a field and what it should con­
tain. As I have already suggested,99 the answers to those questions 
may depend on the part that international law can and should usefully 
96. Pp. 489-560. Although typically careful to expose nooks and crannies, these materials 
suffer from oversimplification and, at the same time, overcomplication. The former problem 
results from the authors' attempt to portray the act of state doctrine as a "principle of judicial 
abstention." P. 489; see also pp. 49 1 ,  493, 503, 506. But see p. 508. The latter results from a 
reading of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 ( 1964) (reprinted at pp. 493-508) 
that, as the authors recognize (see p. 5 1 4), is not compelled. Both reflect a commendable desire 
to fit this chaos into the broader field that the authors have identified, if only through the identifi­
cation of themes. 
If, as is usual, the act of state doctrine prevents a court from adjudicating a claim brought by 
a plaintiff, it may be appropriate to label the doctrine one of judicial abstention, although even 
then, one should attend to the nature and form of the judgment entered, as well as to its preclu­
sive consequences. But, as the authors well know, the doctrine also operates to defeat defenses, 
and in that context abstention hardly seems an adequate description. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 
438 (reprinted at p. 50 1 ). 
The authors' reading of Sabbatino as reflecting "a more flexible doctrine of abstention, appar­
ently calling for case-by-case consideration of a variety of factors" (p. 49 1 )  is supported by a 
quotation wrenched from context. In any event, that reading seems to confuse reasoning with 
holding. See pp. 503, 505. 
What the materials do well is provide a sense of the evolution of the doctrine and of the 
problem of fitting it to the needs of an age in which territoriality has lost much, but by no means 
all, of its holding power. The authors' apparent preference for a functional approach is certainly 
understandable. It is not, however, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in its latest opin­
ion on the subject. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Intl . ,  1 10 S. 
Ct. 70 1 ,  705 ( 1990) ("The act of state doctrine is not some vague doctrine of abstention . . . .  "). 
That opinion will require revisions in the next edition. See pp. 5 1 3, 5 1 5, 546. 
97. The authors recognize that the act of state doctrine has, at least historically, been based 
in part on "choice of law considerations." P. 489. The domestic perspective may have again 
assumed prominence with the Court's decision in Environmental Tectonics. See 1 10 S. Ct. at 
704-07. Yet, a choice of Ia w rationale for the doctrine is problematic. See Dellapenna, Deci­
phering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L. REV. I ,  4 1 -45 ( 1990). 
Foreign sovereign immunity is an area where domestic analogs are obvious, and some of them 
have been incorporated in federal legislation that, since 1 976, has controlled in the area. See, 
e.g., P!J· 387-97 (discretionary functions exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1 605 (a)(5)(A) ( 1988) drawn 
from Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) ( 1988)). Yet, it should not be assumed that 
the doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity and of sovereign immunity have common parentage, 
although today they appear to be shaped and justified by common rationales. See Hill, A Policy 
Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 55  ( 1 98 1 ). 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 39-55. 
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play, for it is in international law that one would expect to find an 
attempt "to realize some underlying kind of justice."100 Perhaps, that 
is, international civil litigation should be a subfield within public inter­
national law. If so, International Civil Litigation, quite uncharacteris­
tically, does not offer much help. 101 The authors may have assumed 
that teachers and students would already be versed in public interna­
tional law. Alternatively and more likely, they may simply have 
yielded to a sense of practical limits on what a course can cover, rely­
ing on their readers' initiative to overcome ignorance in the book's 
exhaustive literature references. Having made that effort I will ap­
proach the question through attention to two topics treated at length 
and with sophistication in International Civil Litigation: service of 
process and taking evidence abroad. 
I conclude that one form of international law, custom, has only a 
limited role to play in these areas and that most U.S. courts and com­
mentators, as well as law reformers, have denied to it even that poten­
tial. Although I see a much greater role for treaties, even here the 
potential has not been realized, and I argue that one need not look to 
international law for a cure. The same disease afflicts us in interna­
tional as in wholly domestic cases and law reform efforts: an unwill­
ingness to surrender power, including by taking separation of powers 
seriously, both when judges are deciding cases and when they are exer­
cising delegated legislative power to make court rules. 
A. Service of Process Abroad 
Many law students learn little about service of process in their law 
school procedure courses, where notwithstanding- or maybe because 
of - Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "service" is 
likely to be subordinated in discussion to the problem of jurisdic­
tion.102 Litigators, of course, must learn the mechanics of service, but 
as the authors point out (p. 120), what they learn in domestic cases 
may ill equip them for the intricacies of international cases. Those 
intricacies consequentially increase two risks associated with service of 
process: ( 1 )  that effective service cannot be made within the time re­
quired by an applicable statute of limitations, and (2) that whatever 
service is made will be deemed ineffective when the time comes to en-
1 00. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
1 0 1 .  Chapter I includes three pages on the "Role of Public International Law." Pp. 1 2- 14. 
For students, I supplement that material with the Judicial Education on International Law Com­
mittee of the Section of International Law of the A merican Bar Association: Final Report, 24 
INTL. LAW. 903 ( 1 990). 
102. FED. R. C1v. P. 4. Because Congress has so infrequently provided or authorized the 
development of federal jurisdictional standards by statute, Rule 4 has played a major role in 
defining the jurisdiction of federal courts, even in federal question cases. See Omni Capital Inti. 
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 ( 1987) (state law governs, subject to due process restrictions 
of fourteenth amendment, when service is made out of state under Rule 4(e) in federal question 
case). 
. ' ! 
i 
J 
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force a domestic judgment abroad. The intricacies of service in inter­
national cases also increase its value to those who regard litigation as a 
war of attrition. The authors pay little attention to the first risk (p. 
148), perhaps because of their emphasis on service in federal actions 
and the recent transmogrification of Rule 3 into a uniform tolling rule 
in federal question cases. 103 They are, however, alert to problems of 
expense and delay and to the risk that the temptation to mitigate them 
may lead to the use of means of service unacceptable to a foreign court 
in the enforcement context.104 
What is missing here is a framework to ground both an under­
standing of the reasons why service of process continues to cause so 
many problems in international cases and an understanding of ap­
proaches, whether in domestic or international law, that have promise 
to resolve those problems. For these purposes, domestic learning may 
not be simply inadequate; it may impede proper understanding. 
Developments in the domestic law of service of process, spurred by 
the needs of a highly mobile society and by the evolving jurisprudence 
of federal constitutional controls on state court jurisdiction, have led 
us to conceive of the function performed by process in terms of the 
interests of the defendant in adequate notice and opportunity to de­
fend.105 We have lost sight of the historic function of asserting the 
state's power, indeed to such an extent that the Supreme Court's re­
cent decision in the Burnham case, 106 arguably reflecting that historic 
function and little more, may seem incoherent. 107 Concern for ex-
103. West v. Conrail, 48 1 U.S. 35 ( 1987); see Burbank, supra note 57, at 698-709. A "second 
chance to comply with the Convention" (p. 148) will not save a litigant from the bar of a statute 
of limitations that requires service rather than filing to stop the period. See Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 ( 1980). 
104. Counsel must carefully consider the advantages and risks of different service mecha­
nisms and select the mode of service (or combination thereof) best suited to the client's case. 
This requires weighing the relative importance in particular cases of the often conflicting 
goals of minimizing costs, ensuring foreign enforceability of any U.S. judgment, and accom­
plishing service promptly. 
P. 127. 
105. Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on 
their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial 
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 14, 733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way 
to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in 
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken 
v. Meyer, 3 1 1  U.S. 457, 463. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3 10, 3 1 6  ( 1945); see Carrington, supra note 64, 
at 733-34. 
106. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 1 10 S. Ct. 2105 ( 1990) (upholding general jurisdic­
tion based on transitory presence of defendant in forum). 
I 07. "The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes 
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due 
process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Burnham, 1 10 S. 
Ct. at 2 1 15. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan's opinion concurring in the judgment is no more 
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pense has led us further away from involvement of the state in the 
process, 108 and impatience with what is seen as the strategic insistence 
on formalities knows no international boundaries. 109 
Not all countries share the American view of the limited role of 
service of process (p. 131  ). Nor should this be surprising when one 
recalls that elsewhere active involvement of the state (through the 
judge) may reflect a normative view of litigation that is deeper than a 
perceived caseload crisis, 1 10 that elsewhere a "foreign" defendant usu­
ally means one affiliated with another nation-state (and not one whose 
courts are bound by the full faith and credit clause or an equivalent), 
and that elsewhere people may not yet have come to regard litigation 
as a fact, however unpleasant, of everyday life.111 
The authors of International Civil Litigation note that, even in the 
recent past, service of process abroad in connection with U.S. civil 
persuasive in arguing that the assertion of jurisdiction in Burnham was constitutionally reason­
able. See 1 10 S. Ct. at 2 1 20..26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Presumably not even the Justices who voted to uphold transient jurisdiction in Burnham 
because of its "pedigree" alone, 1 10 S. Ct. at 2 1 1 6, would sustain on that basis an exercise of 
general jurisdiction over a foreign (including internationally foreign) corporate defendant based 
only on service of an officer within the state. But see p. 42 (noting division among the few courts 
that have considered the question). The Supreme Court long ago held that "[j]urisdiction over a 
corporation of one State cannot be acquired in another State or district in which it has no place 
of business and is not found, merely by serving process upon an executive officer temporarily 
therein, even if he is there on business of the company." James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. 
Harry, 273 U.S. 1 19, 1 22 ( 1927). 
108. Rule 4 was amended in 1983 largely to remove U.S. marshals from the role of process 
servers and to permit greater use of service by mail. Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527 
(codified as amended at FED. R. Clv. P. 4(c)(2)(A), (B); 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), (D), (E)). 
109. See infra text accompanying notes 1 68-70. 
1 10. Whether or not it is still "the view of most civil law countries[ ]  that principal authority 
for all judicial acts is and should be in the hands of public officials," Miller, International Cooper­
ation in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommo­
dation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1 1 32 n.203 ( 1965), the "public character of civil 
procedure," as a result of which "the judge had to become an active participant, directing and 
controlling the unfolding of the proceeding," has long been a characteristic of European civil law 
systems. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 47 1 comment b ( 1987) ("Civil law states generally regard service of judicial process as a sover­
eign act that may be performed in their territory only by the state's own officials and in accord­
ance with its own law."); Cappelletti & Garth, Introduction -Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civii 
Procedure, in XVI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 1 - 1 9  (M. Cap­
pelletti ed. 1984). See id. at § 1 -68. For descriptions of service in other countries, see, e.g., Kohl, 
Romanist Legal Systems, in id. at § 6-94 (" 'service' of the act is governed by a formalism just as 
strict as that governing its drafting . . . .  The law assigns this task to a messenger of justice . . . .  "); 
Schima & Hoyer, Central European Countries, in id. at § 6- 1 39 ("Service of process is an act of 
state and may, therefore, take place abroad only through the foreign authorities."); Wengerek, 
Socialist Countries, in id. at § 6-2 1 5  ("In Socialist states it is axiomatic that procedural docu­
ments shall be served by an officer of the court, and not by the parties.") (footnote omitted); see 
also infra note I l l .  
I l l . One reflection of this may be the requirement in some systems that a judge review the 
complaint before it can be served. See Ekelof, Scandinavian Countries, in XVI INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1 10, at § 6-342; Schima & Hoyer, supra 
note 1 10, at § 6- 1 37; Wengerek, supra note 1 10, at §§ 6-230 to 6-23 1 ;  Vescovi, Iberian Peninsula 
and Latin America, in id. at § 6-396. 
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litigation has evoked diplomatic protests (p. 129). Moreover, although 
the materials might suggest that the problem has been confined to the 
context of administrative subpoenas and implicates only the question 
of "enforcement jurisdiction" (pp. 128-3 1), the authors provide hints 
that such is not the case (p. 125) and question any distinction between 
"notice" and "compulsion" (p. 13 1  ). They do not provide, however, 
sufficient information or perspective for evaluating the "[m]ajority 
view of [the] effect on U.S. proceedings of service abroad in violation 
of foreign law" (p. 128), which is that the violation is not grounds to 
quash. The chapter would be well served by a section, necessarily gen­
eral and comparative, that explores the service rules of foreign states 
and the implications of customary international law.1 1 2 
As the authors implicitly recognize, the best strategy to resolve the 
conflicts undoubtedly consists in international service conventions, 
two of which are included in appendices to the book (pp. 651 -84), and 
one of which, the Hague Service Convention, is explored in detail (pp. 
1 36-60). Such conventions are a substitute for our full faith and credit 
clause, mooting both choice of law and customary international law 
questions (which may not be independent) that can arise with respect 
to service. They are not, of course, a perfect substitute. As the materi­
als in International Civil Litigation make clear, problems of interpreta­
tion remain, about which there can be a difference of opinion within 
one signatory state (pp. 156-60). Differences of opinion are more 
likely between signatory states, because mutually agreed upon lan­
guage masks fundamental assumptions about law and society that may 
not derive from a shared tradition, 1 13 and no tribunal can impose a 
uniform interpretation. But, as the materials also suggest (p. 142 
n. 97), not every conflicting interpretation requires litigation, and the 
framework for dialogue that an international convention establishes ­
perhaps its most enduring contribution - may help to resolve con­
flicts that stem not so much from ambiguous language as from differ­
ences · in those fundamental assumptions. 
Interpretation and discussion, two forms of dialogue, do not ex­
haust the opportunities for accommodation either when a subject is 
explicitly covered by an international convention or when it is not. 
The conventions themselves inevitably present questions as to the 
scope of their coverage, and even when their specific provisions are not 
strictly applicable, they may still bear on the solution to the problem. 
Domestic law may not be clear; customary international law often is 
not. A convention may light the way to bringing the former in line 
1 12 .  Compare the material on taking evidence abroad, discussed infra text accompanying 
note 201 .  
1 1 3 .  This may be a problem even when there are shared traditions in general. See Collins, 
The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious Misunderstanding?, 35 !NTL. & COMP. 
L.Q. 765 ( 1986). 
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with the latter. 1 4  
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In the Schlunk case, 1 1 5 the Supreme Court held that, although the 
Hague Service Convention is mandatory when service of process must 
be effected abroad in another signatory state, the internal law of the 
forum (state or federal) alone determines whether in fact service must 
be made abroad in order to be effective. Rejecting the view of three 
concurring Justices that the Convention itself imposes a check on in­
ternal forum law,116 the Court expressed doubt "that this country, or 
any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to cir­
cumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to 
transmit judicial documents for service abroad." 1 17 The Court also 
found comfort in due process protection of foreign nationals and noted 
practical considerations that are likely to prompt resort to the Con­
vention even when it is not mandatory.1 18  
What the Court in Schlunk failed to appreciate, and what the con­
curring Justices imperfectly articulated, is that the Hague Service 
Convention, as (self-executing) federal law supreme under the Consti­
tution, 119 is deserving of no less respect than a federal statute.120 It 
thus requires interpretation sympathetic to the language, history, and 
goals of the lawmaking enterprise, 121 and laws which are not of equal 
1 14. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 6 1 4, 638-40 & 
n .21  ( 1985) (reprinted and discussed at pp. 623-34); infra text accompanying notes 245-46. Trea­
ties may also provide evidence of "agreed upon principles of international law." Kalamazoo 
Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Govt. of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 427 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (reprinted and discussed at pp. 547-54). But see Weisburd, Customary International 
Law: The Problem of Treaties, 2 1  VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. I ( 1988) (existence of treaties does 
not justify ignoring state practice). 
1 1 5. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 ( 1988); pp. 1 52-54. 
1 1 6. See 486 U.S. at 708- 16  (Brennan, J . ,  concurring in the judgment). 
1 17. 486 U.S. at 705. 
1 1 8. See 486 U.S. at 705-06. 
1 19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. On treaties in general, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 129-7 1 ( 1972); Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10  
MICH. J. INTL. L .  406 ( 1989). On the history of their inclusion in  the Supremacy Clause, see 
Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 547, 55 1 -52 ( 1989). Pro­
fessor Gallant is intent to show that the interpretive position represented by the so-called Biden 
condition (see 1 34 CONG. REc. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1 988)) - executive representations to 
the Senate are binding - is not, pace Senator Biden and others, constitutionally compelled. See 
Gallant, American Treaties, International Law: Treaty Interpretation After the Eiden Condition, 
2 1  ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1067 ( 1989). That may be a small point at which to stick. Historical research 
by Jerome Marcus demonstrates that, in the early years of this country, the Senate had, or had 
access to, the negotiating records of treaties. Marcus argues that senators could have such access 
today and that recognition of a duty to review the negotiating record before advising and con­
senting is preferable to the position taken in the Biden condition, a position that invites dishonor 
of our international obligations. Indeed, the Biden condition may be deemed inconsistent with 
the Supremacy Clause, insofar as treaties were included to ensure that we honor those obliga­
tions. See J. Marcus, Some Historical Evidence on the Treaty Interpretation Debate (unpub­
lished manuscript) (copy on file with author). 
120. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 1 1 2 U.S. 580, 598-99 ( 1 884); Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I ,  2 1 1  ( 1 824). 
1 2 1 .  See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400-05 ( 1 985); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 
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dignity, state122 or federal,123 should not be permitted to frustrate 
either the meaning or the goals so identified. Whether the preferred 
label is preemption or federal common law, 1 24 the idea should be clear. 
The supremacy of federal law requires protection as much from eva­
sion and distortion as it does from overt conflict, and the Constitution 
is not the only federal law to be protected. 12 5 That, indeed, is the 
message of the Rules of Decision Act, 126 which, we may forget, con­
templates displacement of the "laws of the several states" not only by 
"the Constitution" and "Acts of Congress," but also by "treaties of 
the United States," and not only when those sources so "provide," but 
when they so "require." 
Of course, care must be taken both to ensure that state law is not 
displaced lightly and that judges do not overstep their proper roles. 
The latter concern explains the judicial preference for the preemption 
label, 127 but neither concern is unique to the international context. In­
deed, federalism concerns seem diminished in that context, because in 
matters implicating this nation's foreign policy and foreign commerce, 
the states act, if at all, only by federal sufferance.128 
47, 5 1 -58 ( 1929). For an amusing and convincing demonstration that Justice Scalia needs help in 
his campaign to ban resort to "pre-ratification Senate materials for the interpretation of a treaty," 
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 376 ( 1 989) (Scalia, J . ,  concurring), see Vagts, Senate 
Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J. 
lNTL. L. 546 ( 1989). 
122. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 ( 1929); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 
( 1924); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 ( 1796); L. HENKIN, supra note 1 19, at 1 65-67. 
123. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 1 1 8- 19  ( 1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 1 24 
U.S. 1 90, 194 ( 1 888); L. HENKIN, supra note 1 19, at 163-64. For an argument that international 
law and treaties should have greater status than statutes, see L. HENKIN, supra note 1 19,  at 425-
26. 
124. See Burbank, supra note 1 8, at 807- 1 0; Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term -
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV . I, 12- 1 3  n.69 ( 1 975). 
125. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 1 3 1 ,  138 ( 1988); United States v. Pink, 3 1 5  U.S. 203, 230-
3 1  ( 1942) ("state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions 
of, a treaty"); Burbank, supra note 1 8, at 805-29. 
1 26. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1 652 
( 1988). For a fully developed statement of my views about the role of the Rules of Decision Act 
in authorizing and limiting federal common law, see Burbank, supra note 18,  at 753-62, 764-71 ,  
773-74, 787-97, 808-10, 8 1 6- 1 7; see also Burbank, supra note 57 ,  at  703-05. Professor Redish 
now agrees with me. See Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpre­
tive Process. An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761 ( 1989). However, he 
continues to try to except "issues which are, in some sense, procedural," id. at 787 n. 1 04, substi­
tuting one untenable evasion tactic for another. See Burbank, supra note 1 8, at 759 n . l 1 1 .  
127.  See Burbank, supra note 1 8, a t  807- 10. 
128. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1 19, at 227-48. This is not to say that federalism concerns 
have been absent from the conduct of our foreign relations. See id. at 143-48. To the contrary, 
historically they were prominent roadblocks, whether real or imagined, in our ability to enter 
into treaties. See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for 
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 5 1 5 , 561-62 ( 1 953); Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Con­
ference on Private International Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291 ,  29 1 ( 1 965). 
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Treaties may present a discrete set of concerns for preemption or 
federal common law analysis from the perspective of separation of 
powers.129 Whatever their status in domestic law, treaties partake of 
the nature of contracts. Although there need not be a quid pro quo or 
consideration, typically there is. 130 If a court were to engage in a give­
away - to expand the scope of a treaty beyond that contemplated by 
the treatymakers or to require the displacement of laws (state or fed­
eral) not reasonably deemed inconsistent with it - that action could 
compromise the ability of those primarily charged with the conduct of 
foreign relations effectively to implement our national interests 
through dialogue with other nations. 1 3 1  This concern is not, however, 
an excuse for abdication, particularly given the language of the Rules 
of Decision Act and the reasons for including treaties in that statute 
and in article Vl.132 Rather, courts should take special care in deter­
mining what treaties "provide" and what they "require." If, contrary 
to the Court's assurance in Schlunk, a state (versus "this country") 
were to "draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the 
Convention," 133 there is both the power and the duty in the courts, 
federal and state, to displace those laws. 
Schlunk involved state law on service of process and law that, all 
the Justices agreed, 134 was not fairly deemed hostile to or inconsistent 
with the Hague Service Convention. When federal law is in direct 
conflict with, or otherwise derogates from the obligations of, a treaty, 
a different analysis applies. Subject to the mediating influences of judi­
cial interpretation, a subsequently enacted federal statute controls. 1 3 5 
Conversely, judge-made federal law is constrained by, and must be 
1 29. For some this is not a difficulty peculiar to treaties. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' 
Domains, 50 U. CHI . L. REv. 533, 540-44 ( 1 983) (statutes as compromises). 
1 30. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1 1 9, at 142-43; Oxman, supra note 35, at 760-6 1 .  
1 3 1 .  Cf Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 9 1 6  F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1 990) (re­
jecting argument that United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement preempts state law and not­
ing that such an interpretation would be anomalous in light of Congress' "concern with 
achieving rec iprocal trade barrier reduction"); supra text accompanying note 54 (potential of 
judicial restraint in interpreting extraterritorial application of domestic legislation to undercut 
Executive). 
1 32. See supra note 1 19. Today, the costs of dishonoring our treaty obligations may not be as 
obvious as they were in the late eighteenth century. See Holt, supra note 1 19. They are nonethe­
less to be reckoned with. For example, although aliens are protected by due process and thus 
insulated to a very great extent from evasions of the Hague Service Convention, similar domestic 
Jaw protections may not be available to our nationals when sued in the courts of other signatory 
states that follow the interpretation of the Convention given in Schlunk. 
1 33 .  Sch!unk, 486 U.S. at 705; see supra text accompanying note 1 17; cf Brilmayer & Pais­
ley, supra note 62, at 26-27 (discriminatory treatment of federal rights through alteration of state 
law). 
1 34. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J. ,  concurring in the judgment). 
1 35. See Edye v. Robinson (Head Money Cases), 1 1 2 U.S. 580, 597-99 ( 1 884); L. HENKIN, 
supra note 1 19, at 163-64; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § I I  5 ( 1987). However well-established, the later-in-time rule is not without its 
critics. See supra note 123.  
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consistent with, applicable treaties. 136 What of other federal law, in 
particular supervisory court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court 
under the Rules Enabling Act?137 Federal Rules have been at the 
center of the stage of procedural reform since 1938. Their impact on 
international cases is, therefore, critical to the inquiry. 
Notwithstanding more than fifty years of cases and scholarly com­
mentary to the contrary, the primary concern of those responsible for 
drafting the Rules Enabling Act of 1934138 was finding appropriate 
limits for the allocation of federal lawmaking power between the 
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress. The procedure/substance 
dichotomy in the 1934 Act139 was thus designed to serve separation of 
powers values and only incidentally and derivatively to protect feder­
alism values. It was designed to preserve for Congress certain pro­
spective lawmaking choices and only incidentally and derivatively to 
protect lawmaking choices, federal or state, already made. 140 
Congress pulled together and amended the various statutory grants 
of supervisory rulemaking power to the Supreme Court in 1988.14 1 
Although most attention to the legislation has focused on an unsuc­
cessful attempt to repeal the so-called supersession clause, pursuant to 
which Federal Rules trump previously enacted statutes with which 
they are in conflict, 142 the legislative history reveals a determined ef­
fort to bring the rulemakers closer to the original understanding. 143 
Whether under the original Enabling Act or its most recently 
amended successor, Federal Rules relating to the manner of service do 
not usually present problems of validity. Indeed, for precisely that 
reason, the Supreme Court has twice used Rule 4 to extend the influ­
ence of the Rules into areas where they could not have influence di-
1 36. See Henkin, supra note 54, at 1 563-64; Maier, supra note 44, at 4 73-7 6. 
1 37 .  28 u.s.c. §§ 2072-2074 ( 1988). 
1 38 .  Act of June 19,  1934, Pub. L. No. 73-4 1 5, 48 Stat. 1064. 
1 39. The Act provided in pertinent part: 
Be it enacted, etc., That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to 
prescribe by general rules, for the district courts of the United States . . .  the forms of 
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at 
law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any liti­
gant . . . .  
!d. 
140. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1 934, 1 30 U. PA. L. REv. 10 1 5, 1 106- 1 2  
( 1 982). 
1 4 1 .  Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 40 1 ,  102 Stat. 
4642, 4648-50 ( 1 988). 
142. Compare Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 28 1 ("Supersession lives! Long live supersession!") with Burbank, Hold the Corks: A 
Comment on Paul Carrington 's "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1 989 
DUKE L.J. 10 12, 1014 n.6 ("I had thought of entitling this Comment, after Cato the Elder, 
'Supersession Must Be Destroyed.' "). According to 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ( 1988), "[a]ll 1aws in 
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." 
143. See Burbank, supra note 142, at 1029-36. 
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rectly, both times involving limitations law, once in a diversity case144 
and once in a federal question case.14 5 
Service of process abroad is not the usual case, or at least it was not 
when Rule 4(i) 146 was added to the Federal R ules of Civil Procedure in 
1963. The amendment was part of a comprehensive package of pro­
posals developed by, or in close consultation with, the Commission on 
International Rules of Judicial Procedure, which led not only to 
changes in the Federal Rules but to federal legislation and a Uniform 
Act. 147 The academics chiefly responsible for the work of the Com­
mission 148 were impatient with foreign claims that service of process is 
an official act and that unilateral service abroad abridges territorial 
sovereignty, and even with objections to service made in violation of 
local law.149 In opting for a program of unilateral American reform, 
these individuals were following, while attempting to justify, 1 50 the 
time-honored American course of "leading" by example as a prelude, 
if not in preference, to attempting to reach mutual understanding.1 51 
144. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 ( 1965); see Burbank, supra note 140, at 1 173-76. 
145. West v. Conrail, 48 1 U.S. 35, 3 8-39, 40 n.7 ( 1987); see Burbank, supra note 57, at 707-
08; Burbank, supra note 142, at 1022-26. 
146. Pp. 123-27. Rule 4(i) - Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country. 
( I )  Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule autho­
rizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district 
court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a foreign country, it is also 
sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made: (A) in the manner prescribed by 
the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of 
general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter roga­
tory, when service in either case is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C) upon 
an individual, by delivery to the individual personally, and upon a corporation or partner­
ship or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any 
form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the 
court to the party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or 
(E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age 
or who is designated by order of the district court or by the foreign court. On request, the 
clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for transmission to the person or the foreign 
court or officer who will make the service. 
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this rule, or by 
the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to 
subparagraph (1 )(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the 
addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court. 
FED. R. Clv. P. 4(i). 
147. See S. REP. No. 1 580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 2- 1 3  ( 1964); Kaplan, Amendments of the 
Federal Rules o[Civil Procedure, 1961-63 (I}, 77 HARV. L. REV. 601 , 635-37 ( 1964); Smit, Inter­
national Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 10 15  ( 1 965). 
148. See Nadelmann, supra note 128, at 323. 
149. See Kaplan, supra note 147, at 636-37; Smit, supra note 147, at 1017- 19; Smit, Interna­
tional Co-Operation in Civil Litigation: Some Observations on the Roles of International Law and 
Reciprocity, 9 NETH. INTL. L. REv. 1 37 ( 1962). But see Miller, supra note 1 10, at 1072, 1075-86 
( 1965) (more sympathetic analysis of Swiss views). 
1 50. See Kaplan, supra note 147, at 636; Miller, supra note 1 10, at 1 1 3 1 -32; Smit, supra note 
147, at 1015- 16, 1018- 1 9, 1046. 
1 5 1 .  Compare Jones, supra note 128, at 5 17, 556-62 (noting history of "judicial isolationism," 
often dressed up in federalism excuses, and need for dialogue) with Smit, supra note 147, at- 1 0 1 6  
(unilateral domestic reform undertaken "on the view that internal reforms could obviate the need 
for international regulation, but also on the notion that regulation by treaty might invade areas 
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Framed so as "to allow accommodation to the policies and proce­
dures of the foreign country," 1 52 Rule 4(i) nonetheless contemplates 
service abroad that is valid "even if [made in a manner] forbidden by 
the foreign country in which it was made."1 53 Although the Reporter 
thought that would be "an unhappy result,"1 54 the problem was 
deemed primarily one of recognition of judgments.1 5 5  Yet, as was 
pointed out at the time, "[p ]roblems of service of process raise ques­
tions of sovereignty in many foreign countries. They cannot be solved 
unilaterally with disregard of the views of the local sovereign. Those 
who speak of 'tenderness to the sensibilities of foreign nations' . . . 
should study the long list of diplomatic incidents."1 5 6  
Whether or not Rule 4(i) permits service in violation of customary 
international law, it treats a matter that, in 1963 and today, implicates 
the foreign policy and foreign trade interests of the United States. The 
responsibility for such interests lies with the Executive and Con­
gress. 1 57 Federal Rules do not require the approval of Congress (but 
see pp. 124, 129, 33 1), and even if the report and wait requirement of 
the Enabling Act could theoretically or practically be equated with 
approval, 1 58 the process by which Federal Rules become effective does 
not involve the President. The rulemakers have no expertise in inter­
national law, and even if they did, they have no business making pol­
icy choices in an area of international sensitivity, whether or not the 
policy choices actually made are consistent with customary intema-
traditionally covered by state law and thus was a subject to be approached with caution"). Smit 
thus proved Jones a poor prophet. See Jones, supra note 1 28, at 562 ("It is doubtful that it would 
be argued today that the benefits of procedural reform must be denied the state courts in the 
international field, where the states themselves are powerless to act.") (footnote omitted). 
1 52. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) advisory committee note. 
1 53. Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637. For recent advocacy of such an approach, see West­
brook, Extraterritoriality, Conflict of Laws, and the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 
TEXAS lNT'L L.J. 7 1 ,  96 ( 1990). For an extreme example of a mindset that would ignore foreign 
law and the appropriate locus of power to make policy choices implicating this country's inter­
ests in foreign policy, see Smit, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Plea for Drastic 
Surgery, 1 980 AM. SocY. lNTL. L. 49, 66 ( 1980) (criticizing as "improper" provision for service 
of process in 28 U.S.C. § 1 608(b)(3)(E), because of "the introduction . . .  of foreign law as gov­
erning our methods of service, deliberately avoided by the makers of Rule 4(i)"). 
1 54. Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637. 
1 55 .  See id. 
1 56. Nadelmann, supra note 1 28, at 3 1 0- 1 1  n . l 4 1  (citing Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637); see 
also Smit, supra note 147, at 10 18  ("due regard for the sensibilities of foreign governments"). 
1 57. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 1 19. For the role of the courts, see id. at 205-24. 
"[W]hen the Supreme Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an 
enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the en­
terprise in which the Court, or any federal court, is engaged when it makes federal common 
law." Burbank, supra note 1 42, at 102 1 .  
1 58. Pursuant to 2 8  U.S.C. § 2074 ( 1988), Federal Rules must be transmitted to Congress 
not later than May I of the year in which they are to become effective and can take effect no 
earlier than December I .  For a theoretical and practical critique of the view that this mechanism 
is the equivalent of legislation, or at least of congressional "approval," see Burbank, supra note 
1 4(), at 1 102, 1 1 77-79, 1 196 n.779. 
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tional law. The best defense of Rule 4(i), other than the nontest of 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 1 59 is that it was part of an integrated pack­
age, some of which was passed by Congress and signed by the Presi­
dent, and all of which was specifically brought to Congress' 
attention. 1 60 
The same defense is not available for proposed amendments to 
Rule 4 that were published for comment in the fall of 1 989 1 6 1 and 
revised without public notice in the summer of 1990, 1 62 and that are 
currently pending before the Supreme Court for possible promulgation 
and reporting to Congress. 1 63 These proposals do not fall under the 
auspices of a broadly representative Commission, and they are not 
part of a larger, including legislative, whole. 1 64 Moreover, not only 
has this country entered into two international service conventions 
since 1963, 1 6 5  but diplomatic protests have continued. 1 6 6  Both con­
firm the sensitivity of service abroad and the inappropriateness of law­
making in the area at the instance of a self-described "committee of 
1 59. 3 1 2  U.S. 1, 14 ( 1 941)  ("The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, ­
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."); see Burbank, supra note 
140, at 1028- 1032, 1 176-8 1 .  
160. See Smit, supra note 147. Indeed, provisions i n  the legislation passed a s  part o f  the 
package included references to service under the Federal Rules. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 783,  1 784 
( 1988); Smit, supra note 147, at 1037-38. 
1 6 1 .  See Preliminary Draft of Proposed A mendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce­
dure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 27 F.R.D. 237 ( 1989) [hereinafter Preliminary 
Draft]. 
1 62. See Editor's Introduction, Inti. Lit. Newsletter, Aug. 1990, at 1; infra note 237. 
1 63. See letter from L. Ralph Mecham to the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 19,  1990) (copy on file with author). 
1 64. For a time it appeared that doubts about the Court's powers under the Enabling Act 
would lead to submission of one of the proposals, providing in Rule 4 a federal amenability 
standard for federal questions cases, for legislative action. See Carrington, supra note 64, at 744. 
This notion was abandoned in the preliminary draft put out for comment, although a prefatory 
note to the preliminary draft of amendments to Rule 4 made alternative recommendations in the 
event Congress "disapproved" the proposed revision or did not disapprove it. Preliminary Draft, 
supra note 1 6 1 ,  1 27 F.R.D. at 266. The author criticized the provision as beyond the Court's 
powers under the Enabling Act. See letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure at 2-3 (Mar. 14, 1 990) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Burbank 
letter]. The proposed amendment to Rule 4 was drastically cut back, without public notice, to 
provide a federal amenability standard in federal question cases only "over the person of any 
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state." 
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 (copy on file with author) [here­
inafter 17oposed Amendments]. This does not solve the problem of rulemaking power, and it 
raises a host of practical questions that are not answered in the Advisory Committee's Note. See 
id. at 39-40. A "Special Note" contemplates that Congress may disapprove the provision and 
recommends in any event that the rest of the rule be approved. See id. at 1 .  
1 65. See supra text accompanying notes 1 12- 13 .  Besides the Hague Service Convention, In­
ternational Civil Litigation includes the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory. Pp. 
670-84. 
166. See I B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) 
69-7 1 ,  80-82 n . lO  ( 1984). 
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technicians." 1 67 
One set of proposed amendments to Rule 4 involves a system for 
waiver of service, implemented "through first-class mail or other relia­
ble means" and backed up by cost-shifting if a defendant "fails to com­
ply with the request [for waiver] ... unless good cause for the failure 
be shown." The proposed waiver would not apply to objections to 
venue or to personal jurisdiction, but the mechanism would be avail­
able with respect to all defendants (other than the United States, a 
corporation of the United States, and infants or incompetents), wher­
ever they may be found.168 
In a country where "the capias ad respondendum has given way to 
personal service or other form of notice," 1 69 this mechanism would 
make a great deal of sense, reducing incentives to impose unnecessary 
expense and delay.170 Its proposed extension from domestic cases to 
cases where service would have to be effected abroad is, however, 
problematic. The Advisory Committee reasons that "[b]ecause the 
transmission of the waiver does not purport to effect service except by 
consent, the transmission of a request for consent sent to a foreign 
country gives no reasonable offense to foreign sovereignty, even to for­
eign governments that have withheld their assent to service by 
mail."171 This reasoning is not persuasive. 
As the Advisory Committee recognizes, the proposed waiver of 
service mechanism is in fact a mechanism for defeasible service. With 
Rule 4(i) on the books, it is no surprise that this aspect gave no pause. 
One may question, however, whether a waiver is consensual if it was 
executed with the awareness that sanctions 172 would be imposed if it 
was refused without "good cause" according to the notions of a for­
eign legal system. One may also question whether, in any event, a 
private litigant has the power to consent to what her country regards 
as an abrogation of territorial sovereignty.173 Perhaps the Advisory 
1 67. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism 
of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 37 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2076 
( 1989); see Burbank, supra note 56, at 1939 n. 8 1 .  
1 68. Proposed Amendments, supra note 1 64, at 6- 10. 
169. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 3 10, 3 1 6  ( 1945); see supra note 105 and 
accompanying text. 
1 70. See Carrington, supra note 64, at 736; Proposed Amendments, supra note 1 64, at 29-33. 
1 7 1 .  Proposed A mendments, supra note 1 64, at 30. 
172.  "Openly stated, the principle is kin to that underlying recent changes in Rules 1 1  and 
1 6." Carrington, supra note 64, at 736 (footnote omitted); see id. at 737 (noting that "costs of 
formal service . . .  can be substantial"); infra note 1 83 .  
1 73.  "Individual actions cannot change the powers of  sovereignty, although the individual 
can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected." Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n. IO ( 1982). If Switzerland 
regards return receipt mail service as a violation of article 27 1 of the Swiss Penal Code, "which 
prohibits anyone from committing an act in Switzerland on behalf of a foreign country 'that is a 
matter of authority' without first obtaining the permission of the Swiss government," Miller, 
supra note 1 10, at 1077; see id. at !080 n.20, 1 1 1 1 , is it likely to take a different view of "a 
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Committee is correct as a matter of customary international law, but 
consideration of such questions suggests that both the Committee's 
premise and its conclusion are debatable, especially if we imagine a 
defendant who does not understand English. 174 We know that the 
rulemakers have misjudged "foreign sensibilities" 17 5  in the past and 
that judgments about "reasonable offense" are culturally contin­
gent. 176 Apart from existing service conventions, these judgments 
should be made by Congress with participation by the President. 
Moreover, the existence of service conventions not only suggests the 
inappropriateness of the subject for court rulemaking, it raises a dis­
crete and very troublesome question of rulemaking power. One of the 
benefits of treaties, as we have seen, is that they can moot questions of 
choice of law and of customary international law.1 77 Does the En­
abling Act vest the Supreme Court with the power to override a treaty 
in court rules? 
Some countries adhering to the Hague Service Convention do not 
permit service by mail (pp. 1 55-60, 655-69). Indeed, whether a failure 
to make a reservation with respect to article 1 0(a)178 of the Convention 
procedure that effects economic service with cooperation of the defendant"? Proposed Amend­
ments, supra note 1 64, at 26. See Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commis­
sion on the Operation of the Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1 7  INTL. L. MAT. 3 1 7  ( 1978) 
("The Swiss and German observers indicated that no objection would be raised in their countries 
if a copy of a legal document were mailed strictly for informational purposes, as long as no legal 
consequences flow in the sending state from such mailing."). 
In comments on the proposed waiver of service mechanism, one of the authors of Interna­
tional Civil Litigation predicted that "some civil law nations will object, perhaps vigorously, to 
the waiver mechanism." Statement of Gary B. Born before the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 2, 1 990, at 24 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Born State­
ment). He noted that some countries forbid "purely consensual, noncoercive foreign discovery 
(e.g., depositions) on their territory, except under the supervision of their authorities," id. at 25 
(footnote omitted), and that they would likely also regard waivers "as violations of local judicial 
sovereignty." /d. ; cf. Oxman, supra note 35, at 740 n. !6, 78 1 n. 1 34 (private party may not waive 
rights of a foreign state). 
1 74. There is no requirement that the documents sent abroad be translated, but "[i]t would 
. . .  be sufficient cause not to shift the cost of service if the defendant did not receive the request 
or was insufficiently literate in English to understand it." Proposed Amendments, supra note 1 64, 
at 30. See infra notes 1 82-83. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 1 56. 
1 76. Supra text accompanying notes 1 69-70; see Miller, supra note I I  0, at 1 1 3 1 -32; supra text 
accompanying note 1 1 3 .  
1 77. See supra text accompanying notes 1 12- 1 3. Professor Smit argued that 
[t]he absence of an interest worthy of protection is demonstrated most clearly by the willing­
ness of the very same nations that object to the performance of foreign procedural acts 
within their borders in the absence of a treaty to permit such acts as soon as they are cov­
ered by an international agreement. 
Smit, supra note 147, at 1 0 1 8  (footnote omitted). He seems to have neglected both the possibility 
that an "international agreement" may contain a quid pro quo, see supra text accompanying note 
1 30, and that, even if not, it may contain conditions, requirements, and procedures sufficient to 
distinguish an exercise of power pursuant to its authority from a unilateral exercise of power. 
More fundamentally, Professor Smit seems to have neglected the importance of consent in inter­
national law. See Weisburd, supra note 1 14, at 45-46. 
1 78. "Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not 
May 199 1] International Civil Litigation 1 487 
constitutes consent to service by mail is a matter on which U.S. courts 
are divided. 179 We know from dictum in Schlunk that the Convention 
is mandatory when service must, as a matter of internal law, be ef­
fected abroad. 180 The Court also asserted that we need not worry 
about attempts to "draft . . .  internal laws deliberately so as to circum­
vent the Convention." 18 1 Professor Carrington has assured us that the 
extension of the proposed waiver of service mechanism to countries 
that adhere to the Convention "is not intended to circumvent [it] , but 
to take proper account of the sensitivities of foreign sovereigns which are 
properly expressed in that treaty." 182 Accepting his assurance, inten­
tions are nonetheless irrelevant if the proposal is, as it appears to be, 
inconsistent with the Convention.183 If it is and if it were implemented 
for service in signatory countries as a matter of state law, waiver of 
service would be invalid because "state law must yield when it is in-
interfere with - (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to 
persons abroad . . . .  " P. 652. 
1 79.  See pp. 155-60. Compare Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986) (fail­
ure to make reservation under article I O(a) constitutes consent to service by mail) with Bankston 
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 1 72, 1 74 (8th Cir. 1989) (article lO(a) does not authorize 
service of process, as opposed to transmittal of other documents). For a discussion of the diplo­
matic protests involving this issue, see I B. RISTAU, supra note 1 66, at 67-68, 148, 1 5 1 .  
1 80. See supra text accompanying note 1 1 5. 
1 8 1 .  Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988); see supra text 
accompanying note 1 17. 
1 82. Carrington, supra note 64, at 749 n. l 08 (emphasis added). He thus recognized the risk 
that it would be so regarded. See also id. at 737. Moreover, the use of the italicized language 
recalls similar arguments by Professor Carrington's predecessors. See supra text accompanying 
notes 1 56, 175. 
In his comments on the proposed waiver mechanism, one of the authors of International Civil 
Litigation predicted "that at least some states that are party to the Hague Service Convention 
will view the waiver mechanism as a circumvention of the treaty," particularly because there is 
no translation requirement. Born Statement, supra note 173,  at 25 n.33. 
1 83.  Whether or not article lO(a) includes service of process, see supra note 1 79 and accom­
panying text, an article IO(a) reservation includes objection to the sending of "judicial docu­
ments, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." P. 652. Do the rulemakers contend that 
the proposed notice and request and/or the copy of the complaint which must accompany it are 
not "judicial documents"? What of the information "by means of a text prescribed in an official 
form promulgated pursuant to Rule 84"? 
More generally, the cost-shifting mechanism in the proposed amendment may be deemed 
inconsistent with article 12 of the Convention, pursuant to which "[t]he applicant shall pay or 
reimburse the costs occasioned by - (a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person 
competent under the law of the state of destination, (b) the use of a particular method of service." 
Pp. 652-53; see I B. RISTAU, supra note 166, at 1 46-47. 
Finally, the waiver proposal, including its cost-shifting mechanism, may be deemed inconsis­
tent with the provision in article 5 of the Convention that "[s]ubject to sub-paragraph (b) of the 
first paragraph of this article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee 
who accepts it voluntarily." P. 652. Like the waiver proposal, "this method of service dispenses 
with the translation requirements under Article 5(a) and does not give rise to any costs." I B. 
RISTAU, supra 166, at 145. But unlike the waiver proposal, under article 5(a) the addressee "can 
decline acceptance for any reason, including, of course, that the document is not in a language 
which [she] understands," id. at 1 38, without fear of sanctions. See id. at 145 (criticizing this 
country's practice of disregarding requests for "informal delivery," thereby "denying the ad­
dressee the opportunity of refusing to accept the document" afforded by foreign law). 
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consistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty."184 If 
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and unless blocked by legislation, 
however, the proposed waiver of service mechanism would become 
part of federal law, and, under the Enabling Act, "[a]ll laws in conflict 
with [it] shall be of no further force or effect after [it] ha[s] taken 
effect."18 5 
I will not here replay the debate about the wisdom and validity of 
the supersession clause.186 Suffice it to say that the prospect of a Fed­
eral Rule of Civil Procedure, not approved by Congress let alone by the 
President, abrogating or subverting a treaty obligation of this country, 
should give pause to even the staunchest defender of supersession. 
Note, moreover, that the common avoidance technique of classifying 
problems of supersession as problems of validity (of Federal Rules)187 
will not work given existing Rule 4(i), although the Supreme Court's 
unwillingness to find any Federal Rule invalid reveals the technique as 
pure rhetoric.188 Note also that imputing a discrete procedure/sub­
stance dichotomy to the supersession clause, thereby preserving from 
its purview laws that are "arguably substantive,"189 will not work 
either, because presumably nobody thinks laws regulating the manner 
of service fall within that category. The Hague Service Convention 
may deal with matters of procedure, but they are hardly "procedural 
marginalia"190 of the sort that some claim are the object of the super­
session clause. It manifests no disrespect for the federal courts as a 
" 'coequal' branch[ ] of the government"191 to believe that they have 
no more business subverting a treaty acting in a legislative mode than 
they do when deciding cases or controversies.192 
The Chief Justice has asserted to Congress that the "advisory com­
mittees should undertake to be circumspect in superseding procedural 
statutes" and has assured Congress that the rulemakers "will under­
take to identify such situations when they arise."193 One would think 
that treaties called for special circumspection, including in prejudging 
the question of inconsistency and thus avoiding noiice to Congress. 
1 84. United States v. Pink, 3 1 5  U.S. 203, 230- 3 1  ( 1942); see supra text accompanying notes 
1 19-33. 
1 85. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ( 1988); see supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
1 86. See Burbank, supra note 142; Carrington, supra note 142. 
1 87. See Burbank, supra note 142, at 1038. 
1 88. See supra note 1 59 and accompanying text. 
1 89. Carrington, supra note 142, at 325. For criticism of this ingenious effort, see Burbank, 
supra note 142, at 1036-39. 
1 90. Carrington, supra note 142, at 324. But see Burbank, supra note 142, at 1043-45 (super-
session was not originally nor is it today limited to such matters). 
1 9 1 .  Carrington, supra note 142, at 324. But see Burbank, supra note 142, at 1 045-46. 
192. See Burbank, supra note 142, at 1 046. 
1 93 .  Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Oct. 1 9, 1 988), 
reprinted in 1 34 CONG. REc. H 10,441 (daily ed. Oct. 1 9, 1 988); see Burbank, supra note 142, at 
1038 n . 163, 1040-4 1 .  
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Indeed, assuming the validity of the Enabling Act's supersession 
clause, and hence the equivalence of Federal Rules and statutes, the 
Chief Justice's promise is, with respect to treaties, a condition for su­
persession. Abrogation or modification of a treaty by a subsequently 
enacted statute requires a clear expression of congressional purpose.194 
No superseding effect can properly be given to a Federal Rule that is 
inconsistent with a treaty where such a purpose is not brought to the 
attention of Congress, let alone denied by the rulemakers. 
If the proposed use abroad of the waiver of service mechanism is 
not a deliberate attempt "to circumvent the Convention,"1 95 it is diffi­
cult otherwise to regard another proposed amendment to Rule 4 that 
is part of the same package. As originally put out for comment, the 
provision would have permitted a district court, in a case governed by 
the Convention (or other treaty), to direct service in a manner con­
trary to the Convention if service had not been effected within six 
months of a request for assistance to a foreign government. 196 In com­
ments submitted to the Advisory Committee, one of the authors of 
International Civil Litigation suggested that the provision might con­
flict with the Hague Service Convention.197 The provision has been 
deleted. The proposed amendments before the Supreme Court, how­
ever, contain a provision that would authorize service 
by whatever means may be directed by the court, including service by 
means not authorized by international agreement or not consistent with 
the law of a foreign country, if the court finds that internationally agreed 
means or the law of a foreign country (A) will not provide a lawful 
means by which service can be effected, or (B) in cases of urgency, will 
not permit service within the time required by the circumstances. 198 
The Advisory Committee Note reveals that the deletion was cos­
metic only, that the new provision, like the old, is intended to author­
ize service "by means not authorized by international agreement or 
not consistent with the law of a foreign country" when a Central Au­
thority has failed "to effect service within the six month period pro­
vided by the Convention."1 99 The new provision finds no greater 
support for this proposition in article 1 5  of the Convention than did 
the old.200 We see again impatience with delay and an assertion by 
1 94. See Transworld Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252-53 ( 1984); Me­
nominee Tribe v. United States, 39 1  U.S. 404, 412- 13  ( 1968); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 
1 02, 1 20 ( 1933). 
195. Supra note 1 82 and accompanying text. 
1 96. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 16 1 ,  127 F.R.D. at 274. 
197. See Born Statement, supra note 173, at 1 8- 19. 
198. Proposed Amendments, supra note 1 64, at 1 2- 1 3. 
1 99.  Id. at 36. 
200. See p. 653. According to the Advisory Committee, "Article 15 . . .  provide[s] that 
alternate methods may be used if a Central Authority does not respond within six months." 
Proposed Amendments, supra note 1 64, at 35. I find no such authorization in the language of 
article 1 5  and agree with Mr. Born that "(the six-month] period was probably intended to be 
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technicians of the power, if not to override this country's treaty obliga­
tions, then to create a situation where conflict in interpretations is in­
evitable, all through a policy choice buried in drafting history. 
B. Taking Evidence Abroad 
The materials on taking evidence abroad in International Civil Liti­
gation (pp. 26 1 -334) are very complete and very well organized. 
Moreover, here the authors independently provide more information 
and perspective for one interested in the comparative and international 
law aspects of the problem.2o1 
The reader is alerted early to the fact that discovery abroad has 
"produced some of the most contentious disputes that have arisen in 
international civil litigation" (p. 26 1 ;  see also pp. 265-66). The com­
parative information provided includes the insight that " [t]he compar­
atively restrictive scope of foreign discovery generally reflects 
important foreign public policies, such as protection against unreason­
able intrusion into personal privacy,"202 as well as the very practical 
explanation that the inability to recover the costs of discovery in this 
country, as possible in many foreign systems, "aggravates displeasure 
about intrusive and expensive U.S.-style discovery" (p. 265 n.22). 
Although the authors refer to the possibility that unilateral extra­
territorial discovery may violate customary international law (pp. 265, 
278) and raise questions of power to proceed in violation of foreign 
law (pp. 29 1 -92), they do not clearly distinguish between the two. Per­
haps that is because the foreign diplomatic protests reported by the 
authors (p. 279) have not made such distinctions,2°3 and because to a 
considerable extent the questions merge, as for example where discov­
ery must be conducted under the supervision of a judge under foreign 
law. 
Still, it would be useful to know how it is that our courts came to 
confined to cases involving default judgments against defendants who evade service." Born 
Statement, supra note 173,  at 19 .  Article 1 5  seems exclusively directed toward default judgments 
and not to authorize "alternative non-treaty methods of service," Carrington, supra note 64, at 
749, unless, as is most unlikely, "any provisional or protective measure" includes service. See 1 
B. RISTAU, supra note 1 66, at 173 ("Thus, the Convention does not intend to change the internal 
laws of the contracting states to the extent that they may permit the entry of temporary re­
straining orders, sequestration orders, or attachments of property ex parte. "); cf FED. R. CJV. P. 
64 (seizure of person or property); 65 (injunctions). 
Because the rulemakers have denied any inconsistency and hence any purpose to supersede 
the Hague Service Convention, if a court subsequently disagrees, the Convention controls. See 
supra text accompanying note 194. 
201 .  See supra text accompanying note 1 12. 
202. P. 265; cf Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 1 37 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2242-44 ( 1989) (social costs in violation of principle of 
privacy). 
203. See Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Docu­
ments in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 487, 499-500 ( 1969) (protests not 
clearly distinguishing between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction). 
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"prefer[ ] the more familiar expeditious avenue of direct discovery" (p. 
266) from foreigners over whom they have jurisdiction, and whence 
their authority to implement that preference derives. 204 Are there per­
tinent Supreme Court decisions involving foreign parties before the 
Rogers case205 and decisions, moreover, that did not involve blocking 
statutes (pp. 282-83)? To what extent are the authorities relied on for 
the existence of power cases involving statutes that authorize the issu­
ance of subpoenas or, more generally, public law cases? In that re­
gard, Rogers is instinct with concern for "the policies underlying the 
Trading with the Enemy Act" (p. 286), and the Court made clear that 
it was affirming the production order in that case as a legitimate "ac­
commodation of the Rule [Rule 34] . . .  to the policies underlying the 
Trading with the Enemy Act."206 
I suspect (but do not know) that full investigation of these ques­
tions might reveal something at work that we have already seen in 
domestic and international civil litigation: the generalization of a rule 
from specific substantive contexts to all substantive contexts. 207 In 
any event, the materials in International Civil Litigation reveal other 
phenomena that we have seen elsewhere. First, as with service of pro­
cess, our approach to taking evidence abroad has been one of coming 
to the international bargaining table only after staking out an aggres­
sively self-regarding position. 208 Second, as with legislative jurisdic­
tion, 209 in the absence of agreement about the requirements of 
204. The authors point out: 
U.S.  law had historically showed greater deference to the laws of the place where discovery 
was to be ordered. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 94 ( 1934) ("(a) 
state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts to make a decree directing a party subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court to do an act in another state, provided such act is not contrary 
to the law of the state in which it is to be performed"); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 1 49 (2d 
Cir. 1960) (refusing to order production of documents located in Canada because this would 
arguably violate Quebec law); SEC v. Minas De Artemesia, S.A., 1 50 F.2d 2 1 5  (9th Cir. 
1 945) (refusing to enforce subpoena for production of documents located in Mexico when 
this would violate Mexican law). 
P. 29 1 .  
205. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles e t  Commerciales v .  Rogers, 357  
U.S .  197 ( 1958) (reprinted at  pp. 284-89). 
206. P.  287; see Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 5 10- 1 3 . 
207. If so, the culprits are likely to be the Federal Rules themselves, see supra text accompa­
nying notes 56-60; infra text accompanying note 223, and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoN­
FLICT OF LAWS § 53 ( 1971)  (judicial jurisdiction over a person entails power to order that person 
"to do an act, or to refrain from doing an act, in another state"). For criticism of this provision, 
see Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 495-96. 
208. See pp. 309- 10; supra text accompanying notes 146-56; Smit, supra note 1 49; Smit, 
International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61  COLUM . L. REV. 103 1 ,  1056-58 ( 1 96 1 ). It 
comes as no surprise that Professor Smit has recently called on the United States to renounce 
adherence to the Hague Service and Hague Evidence Conventions, objecting to both as more 
cumbersome than domestic law and attempting to persuade his audience that they do not offer 
much if anything to a foreigner that internal U.S. law does not afford. See Smit, Les Conflicts de 
Jurisdiction au Procedure Civile, 1 990 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE, No. 3, 
872. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 14 -55.  
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customary international law, it has fallen to the courts to exercise self­
restraint, and the techniques they have been encouraged to use are 
borrowed from domestic conflicts law.2 10 Third and most important, 
both the Supreme Court and its advisers on Federal Rules have 
demonstrated inadequate respect for the only form of international 
lawmaking that has real promise in international civil litigation. 2 1 1  
This is not the occasion for a lengthy critique of the Supreme 
Court's opinions in the Aerospatiale case, interpreting the Hague Evi­
dence Convention.212 A question that has occupied many commenta­
tors and that interests the authors of International Civil Litigation is 
whether a rule requiring first resort to the Convention for pretrial dis­
covery, advocated by four members of the Court,2 13 is a preferable 
interpretation of the Convention, and better serves the interests of the 
international community, than the ad hoc comity analysis blessed by 
the majority.21 4  That is the wrong question if, as Lawrence Collins 
has concluded: 
First, the Hague Evidence Convention was intended primarily to apply 
to "evidence" in the sense of material required to prove or disprove alle­
gations at trial. It was not intended to apply to discovery in the sense of 
the search for material which might lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. Second, there was some concern at the Hague Conference that 
United States litigants might endeavour to use the Convention for third 
party discovery, and Article 23 was inserted as an attempt (perhaps only 
partially successful in drafting terms) to make it clear that there was no 
obligation on Contracting States to allow the Convention to be used for 
third party discovery. This is so whether the discovery is of documents 
or by way of oral deposition. Third, there is no reason whatsoever to 
believe that the Convention was ever intended to apply to normal inter 
partes discovery, and not even the attempts of successive US delegations 
from 1 978 onwards to encourage the use of the Convention for discovery 
appear to have envisaged anything other than third party discovery.2 1 5 
If Collins is right, it would appear that the U.S. has refined the art 
of unilateral international lawmaking.2 16 And if he is right, then so 
was the Supreme Court in its conclusion that the Hague Evidence 
Convention does not limit the power of a United States court to order 
2 10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 4{) ( 1 965) (p. 299); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 442 ( 1987) (pp. 303-04); Onke1inx, supra note 203, at 500-01 ;  supra note 
46. 
2 1 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 9-33, 175-200. 
2 12. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 
( 1987) (reprinted at pp. 320-28). The Convention itself is set forth at pp. 685-94, and the declara­
tions concerning it at pp. 695-7 1 3. 
2 1 3. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). 
2 14. See pp. 3 19, 328-34; Born & Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Aerospatiale 
Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 lNTL. LAW. 393 ( 1990). 
2 1 5 . Collins, supra note 1 1 3, at 783.  
2 1 6. See id. at 78 1 -82. 
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discovery from a foreign party over whom it has jurisdiction.2 17  That 
would, however, be a fortuity. In rejecting a first resort rule,2 18 the 
majority again failed to give a treaty the respect due an ordinary fed­
eral statute . Rather, having concluded that the Convention does not 
explicitly provide such a rule, the majority declined to· analyze its 
power to create one. 2 19 Moreover, having considered the policies ani­
mating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,220 the majority focused 
only on what the Convention provides and on the requirements of in­
ternational comity rather than those of the Convention.221 
There is a risk of misunderstanding my claim that the Court in 
Aerospatiale "failed to give a treaty the respect due an ordinary federal 
statute." That is, I believe, true in the sense that the Court failed, as it 
did in Schlunk, seriously to engage the policies animating the Conven­
tion and to consider the interpretive or federal common law rules they 
might reasonably be thought to require.222 In fact, however, the Court 
2 1 7. See id. at 784-85. 
2 1 8. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533-40. 
2 1 9. See 482 U.S. at 542. 
220. "A rule of first resort in all cases would . . .  be inconsistent with the overriding interest 
in the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litigation in our courts. See FED. RULE 
Civ. P. 1 ." Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542-43; see also 482 U.S. at 534 n. 16 (noting existence of 
FED. R. C!V. P. 28(b) at time Convention was drafted). 
22 1 .  See 482 U.S. at 543-46. "If such a duty were to be inferred from the adoption of the 
Convention itself, we believe it would have been described in the text of that document." 482 
U.S. at 543. But see Oxman, supra note 35,  at 761 & n.77, 787-90 n. l 50 (suggesting a federal 
common law rule of first resort). 
In an interesting article that explores the application of Aerospatiale in state courts, the au­
thors of International Civil Litigation recognize that the Court "rested its decision [not] on an 
interpretation of the Convention . . .  [but] on the broader doctrine of 'international comity. ' "  
Westin & Born, supra note 4, at 297; see id. at 301 n.20. If that is true, however, how can the 
federal common law they see emerging from the decision be explained in terms "of ensuring that 
concessions made by the federal government to foreign sovereign interests are honored"? Jd. at 
307. The problem may derive, in part, from the authors' failure firmly to grasp the dual nature of 
the inquiry under traditional federal common law analysis, see Burbank, supra note 1 8, at 758, 
which by the way fully supports their conclusion. State discovery procedures govern in state 
court unless they are "preempted." Preemption can take two forms - displacement by uniform 
federal rules or displacement only of state rules that are hostile to or inconsistent with federal 
interests. See id. 808-10; Westin & Born, supra note 4, at 308. 
The problem identified here also occurs in the authors' treatment of federal common law in 
International Civil Litigation. Their conception of federal common law tends to be black and 
white - either state law applies or uniform federal law governs. See pp. 589-90. By failing to 
recognize that under traditional federal common law analysis, as under a Rules of Decision Act 
approach, see supra note 1 26, there is another possibility, the authors do not capitalize on their 
observation, with respect to recognition of judgments, that "there are surprisingly few fundamen­
tal differences in the approaches taken by the various states." P. 565. If that is true, it offers one 
argument against the need for "a uniform nationwide standard."  P. 564. There is, however, 
federal power, including perhaps federal judicial power, to displace any state rule that is hostile 
to or inconsistent with federal interests. See also pp. 1 85-88 (forum selection agreements); pp. 
2 1 6- 17  & 227-30 (forum non conveniens); p. 504 (act of state doctrine). 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 1 19-33; cf Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Coop­
eration, Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 1 9  V AND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 239, 260 
( 1 986) ("the Convention's terms, arrived at through the negotiation process, are necessarily the 
best evidence of the balanced interests of the signatories"). 
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treated the Convention very much like "an ordinary federal statute" 
with respect to its relationship to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In domestic cases, the Court strains to avoid any inconsistency be­
tween the Federal Rules and subsequently enacted statutes, reasoning 
that Congress legislates against the background of those rules and re­
quiring clear evidence of an intent to displace any one of them in a 
specific substantive context.223 Whatever the factual basis for, or nor­
mative soundness of, this interpretive rule in domestic cases, 224 it is 
inimical to international law reform in procedure through bilateral or 
multilateral conventions.22s 
In light of the doubts harbored by the majority in A erospatiale 
about the Court's power to fashion a common law rule of first resort 
under the Hague Evidence Convention226 - doubts that I believe are 
misplaced227 - it may come as a surprise that the Advisory Commit­
tee on Civil Rules published for comment a proposed amendment to 
Rule 26 that would have accomplished the same thing. The proposal 
would have required resort to an "applicable treaty or convention" in 
the case of discovery abroad, preserving discovery under the Federal 
Rules "if discovery conducted by such methods (was] inadequate or 
inequitable and additional discovery [was] not prohibited by the treaty 
or convention."228 
On the merits, there is much to be said for this proposal, which 
preferred Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Aerospatiale 229 to the 
opinion for the Court, although the comity it trumpeted might have 
been more apparent than reaJ.230 As Justice Blackmun pointed out, 
however, "foreign legal systems and foreign interests are impli­
cated,"231 and the Hague "Convention represents a political determi­
nation - one that, consistent with the principle of separation of 
powers, courts should not attempt to second-guess."232 A Federal 
Rule promulgated under the Enabling Act is not a statute, both be-
223. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 698-701 ( 1979); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 
807 F.2d 1000, 1006- i I (D.C. Cir. 1 986), cert. denied, 482 U.�. 9 1 5  ( 1987); Burbank, supra note 
142, at 1044-45. The authors of International Civil Litigation observe that "in the area of judicial 
cooperation, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted treaties providing mechanisms for ex­
traterritorial discovery and service to avoid displacing existing U.S. discovery and service rules." 
P. 14 n.72. 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60. 
225. The notion that domestic interests expressed in court rules are "overriding" in the con­
text of interpreting a treaty, see supra note 220, could also cripple the process of concluding 
international agreements. 
226. See supra text accompanying note 2 19. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 1 19-33; note 222. 
228. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 1 6 1 ,  1 27 F.R.D. at 3 1 8. 
229. See supra note 2 1 3  and accompanying text. 
230. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 1 6 1 ,  1 27 F.R.D. at 320-2 1 .  
23 1 .  Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 55 1 -52 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). 
232. 482 U.S. at 552. 
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cause it is not passed by Congress and because it is not signed by the 
President. 233 It makes no difference whether the vehicle of "second­
guessing" is common law or court rule. Moreover, it makes no differ­
ence that the content of a proposed rule is deemed to advance interna­
tional comity. Once the Supreme Court has authoritatively 
interpreted a treaty, the matter is for Congress and the President. 
These objections were made to the Advisory Committee,234 and, 
for whatever reason, the proposed amendment to Rule 26 that is 
before the Supreme Court is not the proposed amendment that was 
published for comment. Unfortunately, the current text235 and its as­
sociated Advisory Committee Note236 are not a model of clarity. As 
has been noted by one of the authors of International Civil Litigation, 
they suggest power to authorize "discovery on foreign territory in vio­
lation of foreign law."237 Even if not contrary to customary interna­
tional law,238 the exercise of such power could cause an international 
incident. In addition, the proposed amendment might be interpreted 
to supersede Aerospatiale, and hence the interpretation of the Hague 
Evidence Convention therein, by making a comity analysis wholly dis­
cretionary in the case of discovery from parties and persons controlled 
by parties. 239 The new proposal is no more valid than the one it re­
placed, and the drafting history can only enhance suspicion that the 
rulemakers are out of their depth when dealing with international civil 
procedure. At the least, the experience should confirm the wisdom of 
233. See supra text accompanying note 1 58. 
234. See Burbank letter, supra note 1 64, at 4 -5. 
235. In the current text, Rule 26(a) includes the following proposed amendment: "Discovery 
at a place within a country having a treaty with the United States applicable to such discovery shall 
be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty unless the court determines that those meth­
ods are inadequate or inequitable and authorizes other discovery methods not prohibited by the 
treaty." Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 56 (emphasis added). 
236. See id. at 57-58. 
237. In a remarkable and unpublicized reversal, the Committee now plans to propose a 
wholly different amendment to Rule 26(a). The new amendment would require use of the 
Convention (subject to an "inequity or inadequacy" exception) only where discovery would 
physically occur on foreign territory - such as plant inspection or deposition. This amend­
ment wholly abandons the concurring opinion in Aerospatiale, and indeed appears to con­
template U.S.-ordered depositions on foreign territory in violation of foreign law. While 
district judges generally can be counted on to avoid such a result, as they have unanimously 
done so to date, the Committee's latest proposal is an unfortunate development. 
Editor's Introduction, Inti. Litig. Newsletter, Aug. 1 990, at I .  
238. But see Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 496-500; Gerber, International Discovery After Aer­
ospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework. 82 AM. J. INTL. L. 52 1 ,  534-39 ( 1 98 8). In a 
recent article on the proposed amendment, one of the authors of International Civil Litigation 
argues that "(w]hat the Committee has proposed would be an unequivocal violation of interna­
tional law." Born, Fishing For Trouble in Foreign Depths, Legal Times, Apr. 8, 1991 ,  at 30. 
239. Compare Proposed Amendments, supra note 1 64, at 57 ("However, comity may be em­
ployed in matters to which the requirement of the rule does not apply. Cf Societe Nationale 
. . .  ") with Aerospatiale. 482 U.S. at 544 ("prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, 
sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective") (footnote 
omitted). 
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following rulemaking procedures that would have brought the sub­
stantive problems to light. 240 
The recent history of federal regulation of service of process and 
taking evidence abroad is thus one of unilateral efforts to bring the rest 
of the world to see it our way, with attempts to reach mutual under­
standing coming only after we staked out our positions. Those posi­
tions included a refusal to take seriously appeals to customary 
international law that did not accord with our views regarding the role 
of courts and litigation, and regarding territorial sovereignty. More­
over, the primary attempts to reach mutual understanding that we 
have made in these areas, the Hague Service and Evidence Conven­
tions, have been treated with less dignity than a garden variety federal 
statute by the Supreme Court, and they now are being treated with no 
more dignity by those responsible for proposing amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The history alone suggests that customary international law can 
have only a walk-on part in this play. Given the controversy that has 
attended recent attempts to impute consequential restraining force to 
customary international law when sovereign interests, and therefore 
the traditional concerns of public international law, are much more 
apparent,241 that is not surprising. 
Indeed, to a newcomer who approaches these matters from a do­
mestic perspective, it may not be clear whether customary interna­
tional law should have a significant (i. e. , nonsupporting) role in our 
courts, in this or any other play.242 Recent historical scholarship may 
cause her to question hoary statements about the "law of nations" as 
part of our law,243 at least to question how it is that one branch of the 
"law of nations"244 and one alone escaped the domesticating discipline 
240. Part I, § 5(a) of the Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference 
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that "[i]f the Advisory Committee 
makes any substantial change, an additional period for public notice and comment may be pro­
vided." Preliminary Draft, supra note 1 6 1 ,  1 27 F.R.D. at 244. Part II ,  § S(c) of the Procedures 
provides that "[i)f a modification [made by the Standing Committee] effects a substantial change, 
the proposal will be returned to the Advisory Committee with appropriate instructions." !d. at 
246. 
24 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 42-55.  
242. See Trimble, supra note 47,  passim; supra note 54.  One could, of course, conclude that, 
although customary international law has no directly binding force in our courts, it may inform 
the content of federal law that the courts are authorized to make or apply. 
243. See Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 V AND. L. REV. 
8 1 9  ( 1989); Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 V AND. L. REV. 1205 
( 1988). Recent developments in the Middle East give special pungency to Professor Jay's conclu­
sion that "[f]rom the very first years of the country, the law of nations has served more as a 
source of executive power than as a limitation on it." Jay, supra, at 848. 
244. See Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1 789: 
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1 5 1 3  ( 1984); Jay, supra note 243, at 832-
33 .  
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of the positivist revolution.24 5 Other recent scholarship adds to these 
historical inquiries questions about legitimacy and competence.246 But 
these- are questions for another day. 
Treaties, on the other hand, have a potentially significant role to 
play in international civil litigation. I have tried to demonstrate, how­
ever, that in interpreting treaties our courts need not resort to princi­
ples of "some underlying kind of justice"247 characteristic of a discrete 
field, and in particular that they do not need to resort to international 
law to interpret this kind of international lawmaking.248 On the con­
trary, in the process of interpretation treaties require the same sympa­
thetic respect, including respect for lawmaking compromises, that is 
due a federal statute. Whether subsequent lawmaking takes the form 
of federal common law or federal court rulemaking, the respect due is 
for lawmaking choices made through a process specially prescribed by 
our Constitution, one in which the President plays a special role. 
Notwithstanding Schlunk and Aerospatiale, there may be reason for 
hope. In another recent decision interpreting a treaty on matters of 
international civil procedure (agreements to arbitrate), the Court man­
ifested both unwillingness "to subvert the spirit of the United States' 
accession"249 and willingness "to subordinate domestic notions."250 
Perhaps, however, the Court's schizophrenic approach to treaties is 
simply a function of calculations about when it is in the judiciary's 
interest to share power. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
My doubts that there is or soon can be "a distinct, cohesive body 
of law" (p. 1) in international civil litigation or that the themes identi­
fied by the authors of International Civil Litigation warrant treatment 
of the topics they cover as a discrete field251 should not be permitted to 
obscure the great strengths of this book. The increasing importance of 
245. See Burbank, supra note 1 8, at 761 n. 1 2 1 ;  Jay, supra note 243, at 830-33; Maier, supra 
note 44, at 460-63. 
246. See Maier, supra note 44, at 468-76; Trimble, supra note 47, at 707-32. 
247. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
248. The United States is not a party to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 237 n.a (3d 
ed. Doc. Supp. 1988). 
249. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40 n.2 1 
( 1985); see Maier, supra note 222, at 257. 
250. 473 U.S. at 639. 
25 1 .  Nor am I persuaded that we wouid be well served by following Professor Westbrook's 
prescription to abandon personal jurisdiction, international conflict of laws, act of state and sov­
ereign immunity and recast them "within the framework of common policies and goals directed 
to fair, humane, and efficient regulation of business. "  Westbrook, supra note 1 53, at 76. Criticiz­
ing domestic doctrine as insufficiently attentive to international dimensions neglects the fact that 
much of that doctrine was first drawn from, or influenced by, international cases and treatises. 
See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 - 1 3, 56-95. Current doctrine in the five areas may be a 
mess, but it is inconceivable to me that obliterating the lines among them and subjecting all to a 
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international trade to our economy and the consequent increase in in­
ternational litigation in our courts require lawyers who are equipped 
to meet the special demands that such litigation imposes. Interna­
tional Civil Litigation exposes those special demands with a degree of 
clarity, thoroughness, and sophistication that is unusual, let alone at 
the hands of those whose primary concern is the practice of law. 
Moreover, as this review may suggest, the materials challenge stu­
dents, scholars, and practitioners to reflect upon opportunities for in­
ternational cooperation and accommodation that have been missed in 
the past and on means to enhance cooperation and accommodation in 
the future. 
The study of procedure is, or should be, a study in power.252 Inter­
nation�! Civil Litigation demonstrates that issues of power are no less 
important in the international than in the domestic sphere and that 
they are not confined to areas with obvious substantive implica­
tions. 2 53 Moreover, the history of domestic regulation of international 
procedure demonstrates that, however far from the surface the sub­
stantive implications lie, the major concern is, or should be, separation 
of powers, rather than federalism.2 54 But there is nothing new in that 
or in the refusal of the federal courts to acknowledge it. 2 5 5  
multifactored analysis would be an improvement. Compare supra text accompanying note 82 
(personal jurisdiction). 
252. See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note I ,  at 147 1 -76. 
253. For one such area, see supra text accompanying notes 14 -55 (legislative jurisdiction); see 
also Burbank, supra note 57, at 7 14 (" 'real procedure' is hard to find"). 
254. See supra text accompanying notes 102-200 (service of process abroad), 201 -240 (taking 
evidence abroad). 
255. See Burbank, supra note 1 8, at 755-62; Burbank, supra note 140, at 1 1 85-97. Although 
the Supreme Court's recent decision upholding a Rule 1 1  sanction imposed on a represented 
client against a challenge under the Rules Enabling Act might be viewed as a simple reaffirma­
tion of past cases gutting that statute, see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication 
Enterprises, Inc., 1 1 1  S. Ct. 922, 933-34 ( 1 99 1) ,  two aspects of the decision are noteworthy. 
First, the Court was at pains to reiterate that Rule 1 1  is not a fee-shifting provision. See 1 1 1  S. 
Ct. at 934. Second, three members of the Court saw serious problems under the Enabling Act, 
and they voiced "concerns with respect to both separation of powers and federalism." I l l  S. Ct. 
at 940 (Kennedy, J. ,  dissenting). This is progress. 
